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Restoring Equipoise to Child Welfare
Rebecca Aviel*
Since the Supreme Court’s widely criticized decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, the principle that the Constitution affords no
relief for a social worker’s failure to prevent harm to a child has been described as a
“staple of our constitutional law.” Whatever might be said about this principle on its
own terms, it produces very troubling incentives for social workers, who may still face
constitutional tort liability when they act affirmatively to intervene in troubled
families—the unjustified removal of a child from her parents’ custody, after all, is the
sort of infringement proscribed by our Constitution’s charter of negative liberties. This
Article is the first to argue that this imbalance should be taken into account in
determining the level of immunity to which social workers ought to be entitled when
their conduct is challenged in federal court. In a world where social workers cannot be
held liable in federal court for leaving an endangered child in the care of her parents, it
is unacceptable to allow social workers to face liability for wrongfully removing a child
from a dangerous home. In this Article, I offer a reluctant defense of absolute
immunity for social workers initiating child dependency proceedings, arguing that such
immunity can correct a perilous imbalance.

* Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. B.A., Yale University; J.D.,
Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Frederic Bloom, Alan Chen, Clare Huntington, Sam
Kamin, Justin Marceau, Kenneth Rossman, and Veronica Rossman for their insightful feedback. I am
also grateful to Diane Burkhardt for her excellent research assistance. This Article is dedicated to the
memory of Erik Bluemel, whose help in the early stages of this project was both invaluable to me and
typical of his generosity.
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Introduction: Two Types of Error
Imagine a child protection worker assigned to handle the following
1
case: A seven-year-old boy arrives at school one day with extensive
bruising and swelling over his face and arms. The case worker goes to the
home to investigate, and is told by the mother that the boy fell off his
bicycle. The boy gives the same explanation for his injuries. At the social
worker’s request, the mother agrees to have her son evaluated by a
2
doctor. The doctor tells the social worker that the injuries could not

1. This example is modeled after a vignette described in Theodore J. Stein & Tina L. Rzepnicki,
Decision Making in Child Welfare Services: Intake and Planning 69 (William J. Reid ed., 1984),
which is offered to illustrate the importance of obtaining diagnostic assistance from third parties.
2. In this Article, I use the terms “child protection worker,” “social worker,” and “caseworker”
interchangeably to denote an individual who is employed by the agency that provides child protective
services for the relevant jurisdiction, is tasked with investigating reports of child abuse and neglect,
and is entrusted with some decisionmaking authority about the appropriate level of intervention, if
any, for the agency to pursue. Although this usage does not distinguish between caseworkers who have
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have been sustained in the manner described by the mother. On this
conflicting and incomplete record, should the child be removed from the
mother’s care? The social worker must weigh the risk to a young child’s
safety against the trauma and disruption of family separation, making a
3
high-stakes decision with grossly inadequate information.
This is the essence of child protection decisionmaking, in case after
4
case after case. If it were possible even to envision a social worker whose
decisionmaking across her entire caseload reflected only the exercise of
professional judgment in its ablest, most objective form, we would have
5
to conclude that errors are inevitable. In the example given, the
physician could simply be wrong—the bruises and swelling might have
been caused in the manner proffered by the child and his mother, and
thus, a removal would be not only unnecessary, but wrong—a type of
6
error classically delineated as Type I error. If the bruises reflect a
pattern of physical assault that the mother will not acknowledge and the

degrees in social work and those who do not, the convention is fairly common among commentators
and virtually ubiquitous among courts. See, e.g., John M. Hagedorn, Forsaking Our Children:
Bureaucracy and Reform in the Child Welfare System 23–29 (1995); Jane Waldfogel, The
Future of Child Protection: How to Break the Cycle of Abuse and Neglect 5–6 (1998).
3. As one group of researchers has described the problem,
Overestimating the degree of danger could needlessly shatter a family and rupture the
child’s closest relationships. Underestimating the danger could mean suffering or even
death. The decisions caseworkers make every day would challenge King Solomon, yet most
of them lack Solomon’s wisdom, few enjoy his credibility with the public, and none
command his resources.
Mary B. Larner et al., Protecting Children from Abuse and Neglect: Analysis and Recommendations,
8 Future of Children no. 1, 1998, at 4, 4.
4. In 2008, an estimated 3.3 million referrals, which included approximately 6 million children,
were made to state child welfare agencies. Admin. on Children, Youth & Families, U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., Child Maltreatment 2008, at xii (2010) [hereinafter Child Maltreatment
2008]. Of these referrals, about 37% were screened out, meaning that they received no investigation or
assessment. See id. An estimated 772,000 children were found to be victims of maltreatment—about a
fifth of those who received an investigation. See id. at 23. Of these children,
71.1 percent of victims experienced neglect, 16.1 percent were physically abused, 9.1 percent
were sexually abused, 7.3 percent were psychologically maltreated, [] 2.2 percent were
medically neglected . . . [and] 9.0 percent of victims experienced such “other” types of
maltreatment as “abandonment,” “threats of harm to the child,” or “congenital drug
addiction.”
Id. at 26. There is also evidence that a “substantial amount” of child abuse goes undetected by Child
Protective Services (“CPS”). Some of these incidents are not recognized by anyone who might be able
to make a report; some are simply unreported, and others, although reported to CPS, “are erroneously
not substantiated upon investigation due to some overlooked or misinterpreted evidence.” Robert J.
Lukens, The Impact of Mandatory Reporting Requirements on the Child Welfare System, 5 Rutgers
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 177, 217–18 (2007).
5. Stein and Rzepnicki note that the judgments made by child welfare workers tend to involve
“estimates of frequency, probability, and causality.” Stein & Rzepnicki, supra note 1, at 21.
6. Type I error is used to describe a false positive, whereas Type II error refers to a false
negative. E.g., Lukens, supra note 4, at 210–11.
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child is afraid to reveal, accepting the bicycle explanation and concluding
that the case does not warrant state intervention would be erroneous in
7
the opposite way—Type II error.
Although it is plain that both false positives and false negatives can
8
pose significant risk of harm to the child’s well-being, these errors are
treated very differently in constitutional law. The social worker who
resolves the uncertainty by removing the child may be asked to defend
9
her decision in federal court; if she is unable to demonstrate that her
error was a reasonable one, she may face liability for interfering with
parental rights that are constitutionally protected against unwarranted
10
state intrusion. The social worker who resolves the uncertainty by
leaving the child in the home faces no such risk: Even if her decision
results in the child’s death, she will not have run afoul of her
11
constitutional obligations, as the Supreme Court currently sees them. In
short, the social worker is expected not only to make an incredibly
difficult and consequential decision with imperfect information, but to do
so in a legal framework that provides dramatic incentives for inaction.
12
The failures of the child welfare system are too well documented
for us to be sanguine about these perverse incentives for inaction. By its

7. Id. Perhaps most challenging, the bruises might have been the product of an isolated incident,
a loss of control brought on by an unprecedented combination of stressors that are either unlikely to
occur again or that can be mitigated with assistance from the State in some manner other than
removing the child. Experts can (and do) disagree about what would be most beneficial to the child in
such a case, but for the sake of argument, we might be willing to characterize a removal on these facts
as erroneous—a Type I error, unnecessary removal.
8. See infra Part III.
9. Many states have severely restricted or eliminated liability for child welfare workers. For
example, a number of states provide statutory immunity to their caseworkers for actions taken in good
faith. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.203 (West 2010); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 626.556(4) (West 2009);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.421(G) (West 2005); S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8A-14 (1999). In
Colorado, public employees are immunized from liability for all tort claims. See Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 24-10-118(2)(a) (West 2008). Connecticut provides immunity where government officials act
within their discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, authority. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52557n(b)(7) (West 2005). Caseworkers in some states enjoy judicially granted immunity. See, e.g.,
Martin v. Children’s Aid Soc’y, 544 N.W.2d 651, 655 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
10. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232–33 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923). The Court has recently suggested that “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control
of their children [] is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
11. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989).
12. States reported 1730 child maltreatment fatalities in 2007; in 2008, an estimated 1740 children
‘‘died from abuse or neglect,’’ over 79% of whom were under four years old. Child Maltreatment
2008, supra note 4, at 55. Shockingly, 15% of these victims were from families who were already
known to CPS agencies: 13.1% from families that ‘‘had received family preservation services’’ in the
five year period preceding the child’s death, and another 2% who had been in foster care and then
were reunited with their families prior to the fatality. Id. at 57. Some studies suggest that as many as
“30–55% of all child fatalities attributed to abuse or neglect involve children previously reported to a
child protective agency.” Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse Realities: Over-Reporting and Poverty,
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very nature, the system serves society’s most vulnerable and dependent
members, and it is overburdened, underfunded, and utterly ill-equipped
13
to predict, much less prevent, the harm that it is designed to address. A
system that has been characterized as approaching, at, or past the
breaking point should not be further stressed with a legal framework that
skews the incentives for its decisionmakers by punishing only erroneous
decisions to act.
In arguing this proposition, I draw from, but do not take sides in, the
ongoing battle among family law scholars as to whether child welfare
workers should do more or do less. This is a deliberately crude
characterization of the debate—the dispute has been more elegantly
framed as one between the “child protectionists” and the “family
14
preservationists,” and some very persuasive attempts have been made
15
to transcend it —but I choose it to emphasize that in its many variations,
the debate considers whether social workers are too quick or too hesitant
to intervene in troubled families and whether their interventions are too
16
aggressive or too timid. I argue here that this dispute is one of choice-

8 Va J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 165, 192 (2000). Because maltreatment tends to be underreported on death
certificates, the real toll is likely much higher than official reports suggest. Marsha Garrison,
Reforming Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective, 12 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 590, 601 (2005).
13. See, e.g., Lukens, supra note 4, at 180 n.8 (“The almost universal opinion of critics and
supporters alike is that the child welfare system is tragically broken and something must be done to fix
it.” (citing Insoo Kim Berg & Susan Kelly, Building Solutions in Child Protective Services 3
(2000); Jane Waldfogel, New Perspectives on Child Protection: Protecting Children in the 21st Century,
34 Fam. L.Q. 311, 311 (2000))).
14. See Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 637, 639 (2006).
Huntington describes family preservationists as “those who disfavor state intervention with a bias
toward removal” and characterizes their central claim as the contention that “a misconstrued
articulation of children’s rights and de-emphasis of parents’ rights results in too much intervention in
the home in the form of removal (or threatened removal).” Id. at 639–40. Huntington describes child
protectionists as “those who favor aggressive state intervention, even if it leads to removal” and
presents their central claim as the contention that “too much emphasis on parents’ rights and a
misconstrued articulation of children’s rights results in too little intervention in the home.” Id.
15. See id. at 652–55 (canvassing alternatives to the preservationist-protectionist dualism); id. at
672–99 (arguing that families would be better served by a problem-solving model rather than the
adversarial, rights-based model that characterizes the current system); see also Clare Huntington,
Mutual Dependency in Child Welfare, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1485, 1487–88 (2007).
16. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Nobody’s Children: Abuse and Neglect, Foster Drift,
and the Adoption Alternative 24 (1999); Margaret F. Brinig, Choosing the Lesser Evil: Comments
on Besharov’s “Child Abuse Realities”, 8 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 205, 209 (2000); Paul Chill, Burden of
Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency Removal in Child Protective Proceedings, 42 Fam.
Ct. Rev. 540, 542 (2004); Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for the TwentyFirst Century: Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children’s Welfare, 6 Mich. J. Gender & L. 381,
443 (2000) (“The child welfare system needs to . . . intervene in fewer families, to close cases more
quickly, to recognize the damage done by its very attempts to help children as well as by its
authoritarian meddling and bureaucratic self-preservation. It needs, in far more cases than it does
now, to do nothing.”); James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States’ Continued Consignment
of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 407, 455 (2008); Richard J. Gelles & Ira
Schwartz, Children and the Child Welfare System, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 95, 96 (1999); Martin
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of-error: no family preservationist would insist that children remain in
17
the home of parents who starve, beat, and rape them, nor would the
most fervent child protectionist suggest that a child should be removed
from a family that poses less of a threat to the child’s well-being than the
18
trauma and disruption of removal. Essentially, the dispute is whether it
is better to engage in removal that turns out to be unnecessary or in
delay that turns out to be tragic—again, typically shorthanded as Type I
or Type II error. I do not take a position on which type of error we
19
should prefer, but instead assert that it does not make sense to subject

Guggenheim, Somebody’s Children: Sustaining the Family’s Place in Child Welfare Policy, 113 Harv.
L. Rev. 1716, 1724 (2000) (reviewing Bartholet, supra).
17. Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative,
75 Geo. L.J. 1745, 1775–76 (1987) (“Few would dispute that state intervention on behalf of the child is
justified in cases of parental abandonment, intentional infliction of serious injuries, sexual abuse, or
other behavior that creates grave risks of death or serious physical harm. All current jurisdictional
statutes permit state intervention in these circumstances, and every minimum intervention advocate
has agreed that they should.”); see also Dorothy Roberts, Shattered Bonds: The Color of Child
Welfare 255 (2002) (“I do not argue that Black children who are abused and neglected should never
be removed from their parents. Surely Black children deserve the same protection from injury as
others.”).
18. There is real disagreement over the extent to which children should be removed from their
parents for neglect. Some scholars argue that neglect-based interventions take children away from
parents whose primary sin is poverty, many of whom could be loving and responsible caretakers if they
were provided material assistance in the form of housing, child care, and the like. See, e.g.,
Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 1724. Others emphasize that neglect should not be minimized as a basis
for state intervention, because neglect can be very harmful for children. Bartholet, for example, argues
as follows:
Many who concede the seriousness of physical and sexual abuse contend that the neglect
category sweeps in all sorts of “minor problem” and “mere poverty” cases. Family
preservation advocates often treat it as self-evident that neglect cases are insufficiently
serious to warrant state intervention, citing the fact that neglect accounts for a majority of
all substantiated cases as proof that the CPS system intervenes unduly in the family.
. . . But available evidence indicates that the great preponderance of today’s neglect cases
pose extremely serious threats to children’s welfare.
Bartholet, supra note 16, at 66–67. For discussions of the effect of neglect on childhood development,
see Rachael Kelly, Childhood Neglect and its Effects on Neurodevelopment: Suggestions for Future
Law and Policy, 8 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 133 (2007); Janet Weinstein & Ricardo Weinstein,
Before It’s Too Late: Neuropsychological Consequences of Child Neglect and Their Implications for
Law and Social Policy, 33 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 561 (2000).
19. For an exposition of the view that social workers should be more concerned about avoiding
Type II errors, see John R. Howard, Rearguing DeShaney, 18 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 381, 406 (2001).
Howard asserts:
Resolution of the dilemma about choice of error should be a function of (1) the cost of
the error, and (2) the capacity of the parties to defend themselves. Application of this
formula requires resolution of ambiguity in favor of the child.
For a type-one error, the price paid by the child for the state’s failure to intervene is loss
of life or limb or the eternal twilight of Joshua DeShaney. For a type-two error, the costs to
the parent where intervention was not necessary may be mental anguish, loss of reputation,
and loss of time resolving the matter. These are serious costs, to be sure, but less serious
than death, brain damage, or permanent disability. The parent or guardian harmed by an
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only one type of social worker error to after-the-fact legal scrutiny. After
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, social
workers do not have to answer for Type II error as a matter of
20
substantive constitutional law. What then, is the virtue of requiring
them to answer for Type I error? How can we justify a legal scheme in
which a social worker can be held liable in federal court for removing a
child from his home, but not for leaving him there? I argue that the
persistence and intensity of the scholarly debate over state intervention
counsel against accepting this imbalance.
Let me also clarify at the outset that I do not intend to suggest that
this is the most important obstacle bedeviling the child welfare system,
much less the only one. Rather, I focus on it here because it is a problem
created by the federal courts and one they have the power to correct. As
I have no expectation that the Supreme Court will correct this inequity
by revisiting DeShaney, I propose instead a different way of restoring
equipoise to child welfare: I argue that we must account for DeShaney
when we assess the level of immunity to which social workers should be
entitled when their conduct is challenged in federal court, a question that
21
has received surprisingly little attention from scholars.
For more than sixty years, the Supreme Court has been fretting
about the possibility that public officials will be unduly hamstrung in the
22
exercise of their duties by concerns about personal liability. The Court
has thus developed a set of immunities that, to varying degree, shield
public officials from liability for constitutional tort suits brought under
23
42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the very least, public officials may invoke the

incorrect decision has a chance to be made whole. The battered child—the Joshuas, the
Jessica Cortezes, and the Michael Bakers—do not.
. . . Certainly the social work profession ought to maintain a preference for preservation of
the family and should not precipitously separate parents from their children. But in a world
of ambiguity where danger looms, doubt should be resolved in favor of the child.
Id.
20. 489 U.S. 189, 202–03 (1989).
21. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Absolute Immunity: General Principles and Recent Developments,
24 Touro L. Rev. 473, 499–500 (2008); Margaret Z. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not a Big Tent: The
Improper Expansion of Absolute Judicial Immunity to Non-Judges in Civil Rights Cases, 59 SMU L.
Rev. 265, 286–90 (2006); H.W. Mondros, Austin v. Borel: Louisiana Child Protection Workers Enjoy
Only Qualified Immunity from Section 1983 Actions, 62 Tulane L. Rev. 1453, 1453–59 (1988); Eric P.
Gifford, Comment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Social Worker Immunity: A Cause of Action Denied, 26 Tex.
Tech L. Rev. 1013 (1995).
22. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951) (“Legislators are immune from deterrents to
the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public
good. One must not expect uncommon courage even in legislators.”).
23. These immunities are not to be found in the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is silent on the
matter. Indeed, the plain text of § 1983 imposes liability on
[any] person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
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defense of qualified immunity, which forecloses the imposition of liability
unless the official violated a constitutional right that was clearly
24
established at the time of the challenged conduct. While qualified
25
immunity is the norm for executive officers, the Supreme Court has
identified a subset of officials whose “special functions require a full
26
exemption from liability.” I propose that social workers be included in
the narrow group of officials who are entitled to absolute immunity for
27
certain categories of conduct.
In Part I, I set forth the constitutional framework, tracing
DeShaney’s distorting effect on the landscape of child welfare
decisionmaking. I argue that the particular vulnerability of endangered
children requires an effort to equalize the incentives that confront a
social worker on the threshold of a removal decision. I argue that
because DeShaney completely eliminates liability for social workers who
decide against intervention, no matter how egregious or unjustifiable the
failure, social workers should enjoy a commensurately absolute
immunity when they decide that intervention is warranted. In Part II, I
turn to the doctrine of official immunity and explain why extending
absolute immunity to social workers is more or less consistent with the
Court’s current immunity jurisprudence, in large part because this
doctrine is substantially predicated on exactly the sort of policy concerns
that animate my proposal. In Part III, I acknowledge that the policy
considerations undergirding official immunity doctrines rest on
assumptions about deterrence for which we have no empirical evidence,
and I explain why that is not fatal to my proposal. In Part IV, I address
the concern that the extension of absolute immunity to social workers
creates an unacceptable barrier to compensation for those families
harmed by affirmative social worker misconduct. In Part V, I sketch out

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). When confronted with a suit brought under § 1983 against state legislators,
however, the Supreme Court refused to conclude that Congress had intended with this broad language
to abrogate those immunities, such as the legislative privilege, that had existed at common law. See
Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951).
24. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2001).
25. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 (1986) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807
(1982)).
26. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978).
27. As I will explain in detail in the following Parts, some circuits have extended absolute
immunity to social workers for conduct that can be analogized to the functions of a prosecutor. In the
Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, social workers are extended the same sort of
immunity enjoyed by prosecutors: They cannot be held liable for conduct that is intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the child protection process, no matter how egregious the constitutional
violation. See infra note 98.
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the parameters of my proposal, and finally, I conclude my reluctant
defense of absolute immunity.

I. DESHANEY’S Aftermath: Only One Type of Liability
The principle that the Constitution affords no relief for a social
worker’s failure to prevent harm to a child unless the state created or
28
amplified the danger has become “a staple of our constitutional law.”
The origin of this principle is DeShaney, in which the Supreme Court
considered whether a child’s right to due process was violated by the
Department of Social Services’ (DSS) repeated failure—in the face of
29
overwhelming evidence—to protect him from his father’s violence.
Joshua DeShaney was three years old when his stepmother first
30
complained to the police that his father was hitting him. Randy
DeShaney denied the allegations, and the DSS took no further action
until it was notified a year later that Joshua had been admitted to the
31
“hospital with multiple bruises and abrasions.” DSS obtained an order
placing Joshua in the temporary custody of the hospital, but then
recommended that Joshua be returned to his father’s custody after the
county’s Child Protection Team concluded there was insufficient
32
evidence of abuse. Although the DSS caseworker was informed a
month later by emergency room personnel that Joshua had again
sustained suspicious injuries, she “concluded that there was no basis for
33
action.” Over the next six months, she visited the DeShaney home
monthly. During this time, she “observed a number of suspicious injuries
on Joshua’s head” and “dutifully recorded” her suspicions that Joshua
34
was being physically abused at home. DSS was notified in November
1983 that Joshua had been admitted to the hospital a third time for
35
injuries that medical staff believed had been caused by child abuse. On
the caseworker’s next two visits to the DeShaney home “she was told
that Joshua was too ill to see her,” and several months later, Randy beat
36
Joshua into a life-threatening coma. The damage to Joshua’s brain,
caused by traumatic injuries inflicted over a long period of time, would
37
require that Joshua be institutionalized for the rest of his life.
28. See Estate of Bennett v. City of Philadelphia, 499 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 2007).
29. 489 U.S. 189, 194 (1989).
30. Id. at 192.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 192–93.
35. Id. at 193. These injuries included a “cut forehead, bloody nose, swollen ear, bruises on both
shoulders.” Robert G. Meyer & Christopher M. Weaver, Law and Mental Health: A Case-Based
Approach 340 (2006).
36. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
37. Id.
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A divided Court affirmed the dismissal of Joshua’s § 1983
complaint, explaining that “nothing in the language of the Due Process
Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of
38
its citizens against invasion by private actors.” The Court explained,
The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s
power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and
security. It forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty,
or property without “due process of law,” but its language cannot fairly
be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure
39
that those interests do not come to harm through other means.

Nor does the State trigger such an obligation simply by becoming aware
of a child’s plight and “proclaim[ing], by word and by deed, its intention
40
to protect him.”
The intervening years have illustrated in acute detail the harshness
41
of DeShaney’s decree. Even where a social worker’s failure to protect a
child from almost certain harm can be said to rise to the level of
recklessness, plaintiffs have been largely unsuccessful in characterizing
42
the State’s involvement as having created or exacerbated the harm.
Whatever might be in evidence regarding a child’s vulnerability, the
quantum of certainty that might be ascribed to the social worker, or the
horror of the violence to which the child was ultimately subjected,
constitutional tort actions filed on behalf of abused children continue to
43
yield the same result. In the face of gruesome fact patterns, courts

38. Id. at 195.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 197.
41. See Howard, supra note 19, at 382 (“DeShaney has become a rock on which many a case has
foundered in the decade since it was decided.”); Laura Oren, Safari into the Snake Pit: The StateCreated Danger Doctrine, 13 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1165, 1173 (2005) (“DeShaney seems to have
sealed the fate of children’s protection claims against child welfare systems.”).
42. See, e.g., S.S. ex rel. Jervis v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 962–63 (8th Cir. 2000). A three-year-old
child was taken into protective custody by the Missouri Division of Family Services after reports that
her father smeared feces on her face, locked her in her bedroom for periods of time, and that the child
previously suffered sexual abuse. Id. at 964–65 (Gibson, J., dissenting). The social workers assigned to
her case learned that the father was closely associated with a convicted sex offender named Griffiths;
in fact, the father brought Griffiths with him on several of his supervised visits with the child. Id. at
965. The social workers also learned from numerous sources that the child’s father had allowed contact
between Griffiths and the child on multiple occasions. Id. Despite their knowledge that the child had a
yeast infection and complained of vaginal pain, and contrary to the warnings of the doctor who
conducted a psychological evaluation on the father, the social workers nonetheless released the child
to her father’s care. Id. Less than three months later Griffiths sodomized her, which caused her to be
hospitalized for a week. Id. at 966. Nevertheless, the majority held that “[w]hile the state did do
something here . . . in the peculiar circumstances of this case the state’s act is the same as if it had done
nothing.” Id. at 963 (majority opinion).
43. See Estate of Bennett v. City of Philadelphia, 499 F.3d 281, 285 (3d Cir. 2007) (describing an
autopsy report, which concluded that the plaintiff had died of malnourishment, laceration of the liver,
and blunt force injuries located all over her body); Powell v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 114 F.3d 1074,
1076–77 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The baby’s treating physicians described the baby’s case as one of the worst
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remain confident that they are faithfully adhering to DeShaney’s
mandate, applying the law rather than reacting to the emotion
44
engendered by a child’s suffering.
45
Beginning with DeShaney’s passionate dissenters, a well-developed
46
body of criticism exposes the majority opinion’s many failings. Contrary
to the original intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment, who
contemplated a federal constitutional right to protection from private
47
violence, the majority insists that the Constitution operates only to
48
constrain—and never to compel—government action. As Susan Bandes
has argued so forcefully, the majority imbues with “talismanic”
significance a rigid distinction between action and inaction “that is far
too arbitrary and simplistic to describe the complex web of acts and
49
omission through which the government conducts its business.” A close
reading of DeShaney itself reveals the failure of this distinction: In
characterizing the case as one in which the State merely stood by
ineffectually in the face of private violence, leaving Joshua “in no worse
position” than if the State had never become aware of Joshua’s existence,
50
or had never existed itself, the majority presents a distorted version of

instances of child abuse they had ever seen.”); Tony L. ex rel. Simpson v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182, 1184
(6th Cir. 1995) (“[Plaintiffs] experienced from an early age onward some of the most despicable acts of
sexual and physical abuse imaginable.”).
44. See, e.g., Wooten v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 696, 701 (11th Cir. 1995) (“In applying the law,
however, we cannot be guided by emotions.”).
45. Justice Brennan wrote a dissent, in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined. 489 U.S. at
203. Justice Blackmun also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 212.
46. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due Process
Clause, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 982, 983–95 (1996) (canvassing the range of “impassioned and unequivocally
negative” criticisms and noting that the scholarly response to DeShaney has been “nearly universal
condemnation”); see also Theodore Y. Blumoff, Some Moral Implications of Finding No State Action,
70 Notre Dame L. Rev. 95, 98 (1994) (“[N]either the text of the Fourteenth Amendment nor
precedent compelled this result. . . . [T]he Court . . . turned the state action component of the
Fourteenth Amendment into a forceful shield for the state.”); Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition,
Formalism, and the “Free World” of DeShaney, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1513, 1514 (1989) (“Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the majority in DeShaney is an abomination. It is illogical and
extremely mechanistic; it also abuses history, fails to consider practical impact, and demonstrates
moral insensitivity. Not only that, it is wrong.”); Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional
Space: What Lawyers Can Learn From Modern Physics, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 9–10 (1989)
(characterizing the majority’s view of the State as “stilted” and “primitive”).
47. Steven Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 41 Duke L.J. 507, 546 (1991) (“A central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Reconstruction legislation was to establish the right to protection as a part of the federal Constitution
and laws, and thus to require the states to protect the fundamental rights of all persons . . . . The
debates in the Thirty-Ninth Congress over the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of
1866 confirm that the constitutional right to protection was understood to include protection against
private violence.” (footnote omitted)).
48. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195–96.
49. Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2271, 2273, 2279
(1990).
50. 489 U.S. at 201.
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the State’s relationship with Joshua that obscures the full sequence of the
51
52
State’s choices and the attendant consequences. This elision of the
affirmative aspects of the State’s involvement with Joshua smoothes the
way for the majority to distinguish the relationship Joshua has with the
State from those “limited circumstances” in which “the Constitution
imposes upon the State affirmative duties of care and protection with
53
respect to particular individuals.” The opinion then explains that the
State owes these duties only to those individuals in its physical custody,
54
such as prison inmates or patients of mental institutions.
In limiting affirmative state obligations to custodial contexts
involving tangible physical restraint, the opinion fails to acknowledge the
condition of dependence, which justifies and demands positive state
assistance for one who has been affected by catastrophically inept state
55
decisionmaking. The failure to grapple with Joshua’s dependence as a
fact of constitutional significance is expressed most revealingly in the
reference, as cruel as it is absurd, to Joshua’s existence “in the free
56
Painfully absent from the majority opinion is an
world.”
acknowledgement that a three-year-old returning to an abusive home is
as dependent on the State for protection from harm as any prison inmate
57
or mental patient in the State’s custody.
DeShaney, for all these reasons, is wrong on its own terms. But
especially in light of the vulnerability of the children who depend on
state assistance, it is particularly troubling to eliminate social worker
liability for failures to intervene where the law continues to allow social
workers to be held liable for affirmative conduct. Substantive
constitutional doctrine tells us that the removal of a child from her
parent’s care is an exercise of state power that implicates constitutionally
58
protected liberty interests in family integrity. In fact, although much

51. See Bandes, supra note 49, at 2288–90.
52. I have tried to capture this dynamic by raising the possibility that the state’s pattern of act and
omission may indeed have been the most dangerous possible sequence for Joshua:
[T]he stress of intermittent monitoring and potential punitive sanction by the state can
aggravate tensions within a household; an abusive parent may very well blame the child for
the state’s involvement, causing increased frequency and severity of abuse. If the state then
turns around and abandons the child after having thus made him more vulnerable,
“inaction” hardly captures the blameworthiness of the state’s capricious involvement.
Rebecca Aviel, Compulsory Education and Substantive Due Process: Asserting Student Rights to a Safe
and Healthy School Facility, 10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 201, 233–34 (2006).
53. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198.
54. Id. at 198–200.
55. See Bandes, supra note 49, at 2296.
56. Id. at 201.
57. See Blumoff, supra note 46, at 130 (“These chilling allusions to freedom and the ‘free world’
lack all coherence in reference to a brain damaged four year old. . . . What is the ‘free world’ that these
decision-makers envision?”).
58. See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (“Here we are concerned with
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remains unclear about the precise parameters of parental rights, the
Supreme Court has characterized the “interest of parents in the care,
custody, and control of their children” as “perhaps the oldest of the
60
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” When social
workers intercede in a troubled family, seeking custody of a child over a
parent’s objections, they must tread carefully lest they engage in the sort
61
of affirmative state conduct proscribed by a charter of negative liberties.
62
This is as it should be, except for the perverse effect it produces in
concert with DeShaney. After DeShaney, as Thomas Eaton and Michael
Wells have stated so plainly, “the decision to do nothing is beyond
challenge in constitutional tort. DeShaney tells the social worker that it is
safer from a standpoint of personal liability to leave an endangered child
63
in the home than to attempt to remove him.” Margo Schlanger has
captured this dynamic as well, noting that “[p]olice or welfare agencies
may be able to avoid constitutional liability by doing less, because their
constitutional duties are negative. That is, doing nothing may be bad
policing or may provide bad child protection, but it’s not
64
unconstitutional.”
Doing nothing, of course, is terrible child protection in many
circumstances, as DeShaney itself demonstrates so dramatically. That is
not to say that inert or lackadaisical policing is unproblematic. But police
officers, for the most part, discharge their duties in a general way, to the
public at large. Unlike social workers, they simply do not develop
particular relationships with at-risk individuals who will bear the brunt of
an official’s refusal to take action in the face of private violence. The
children who suffer when social workers do nothing occupy the extreme

the most essential and basic aspect of the familial privacy—the right of the family to remain together
without the coercive interference of the awesome power of the state. . . . [This right] has received
consistent support in the cases of the Supreme Court.”).
59. See infra Part IV.
60. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
61. This notion of constitutional obligation was articulated by Judge Posner in Jackson v. City of
Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983). In asserting that the Constitution is “a charter of negative
rather than positive liberties,” he explained that “[t]he men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not
concerned that government might do too little for the people but that it might do too much.” Id.
62. I am sympathetic to the critique espoused by several prominent theorists that negative liberty,
by defining private spheres in which the state may not intrude, creates a privilege for the strong to
exploit or subordinate the weak without state sanction. See Robin West, Introduction to
International Library of Essays in Law & Legal Theory (Second Series): Rights, at xi, xiv–xix
(Robin West, ed., 2001) [hereinafter West, Rights] (summarizing the key arguments of the “rights
critique”). But as Robin West has argued, the most inspiring prospects for ameliorating this dynamic
lie in recognizing positive rights alongside negative liberties, rather than abandoning negative liberties
altogether: In short, I share the premise that “[t]o accord all individuals dignity, concern, and respect
sometimes requires the state to refrain from acting, and sometimes to act.” Id. at xx.
63. Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional Tort:
DeShaney and its Aftermath, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 107, 131–32 (1991).
64. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1555, 1674 (2003).
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end of the vulnerability spectrum. They are peculiarly dependent on
vigorous, unimpeded decisionmaking that is unsullied, to the greatest
extent possible, by external considerations such as the social worker’s
own liability calculus.
In a world where DeShaney came out differently, in which social
workers had some sort of constitutional duty to protect or rescue a
specific child assigned to their care and known to them to be in grave
65
danger, they could face federal liability for an unjustified removal or for
an unjustified failure to act. Even if the affirmative constitutional duty
for social workers were as modest as it is for the administrators of mental
66
health facilities, who must show the exercise of professional judgment,
on the threshold of decision, their personal liability would be in
equipoise. In the world that we have, however, in which every indication
is that DeShaney’s central premise is here to stay, we must find another
way to restore that equipoise. In the Part that follows, I argue that we
can draw from the Supreme Court’s immunity jurisprudence to confer
upon social workers the sort of protection for their affirmative conduct
that is as robust as that which DeShaney provides for their omissions.

II. Equalizing Social Work Incentives with Absolute Immunity
Absolute immunity for social workers is not so much a departure
from as it is an extension of the Supreme Court’s existing immunity
jurisprudence. The Court’s early immunity decisions reflected an
interpretive method that began with an assessment of the scope of
67
immunity accorded to a particular type of public official at common law.

65. Susan Bandes exposes the frailty of “slippery slope” arguments that justify DeShaney’s central
premise by proclaiming the impossibility of drawing a line between what government is and is not
constitutionally required to do. Bandes, supra note 49, at 2332. She notes that “the proposed duty, as
in DeShaney, is usually narrowly defined, and would obligate an existing public agency to perform a
specific (and often, already promised or statutorily mandated) action on behalf of an identified
individual or class.” Id. She posits,
In the DeShaney case, . . . it would have been consistent with due process for the Court
to construct a narrow holding that the state had abused its power by failing to provide
statutorily required services to the plaintiff when it promised to do so, had notice of his life
threatening situation and had indeed contributed to that situation when it returned him to
his violent home.
Id. at 2333.
66. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982). Prison officials can be held liable under
the Eighth Amendment if it can be proved that they knew inmates faced a substantial risk of serious
harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
67. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976) (“[Each decision] was predicated upon a
considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded to the relevant official at common law and
the interests behind it.”). This of course rests on the assumption that Congress, without saying so,
intended § 1983 to be read as having incorporated existing common law immunities.
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68

The Court purported to be doing the same when it considered whether
prosecutors were shielded by the sort of absolute immunity enjoyed by
69
70
legislators and judges, or by the more limited immunity applicable to
71
police officers. The Court concluded that prosecutors are entitled to
absolute immunity, but its effort to cast the decision as grounded in the
72
common-law immunity historically afforded to prosecutors was not
entirely convincing. All the cases the Court relied on to reach the
conclusion that absolute prosecutorial immunity was “well settled” at
73
common law were decided after the enactment of § 1983, making them
74
essentially irrelevant to a determination of congressional intent.
A. From Congressional Intent to Considerations of Policy
The Court was considerably more transparent in discussing the
75
public policy implications of prosecutorial immunity, expressing its

68. Id.
69. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
70. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553 (1967). The Supreme Court announced that it had “no
difficulty” accepting the proposition the judges were entitled to absolute immunity. Id. The Court
began by observing that “[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the
immunity of judges for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.” Id. at 553–54.
Noting that the immunity is so absolute as to extend even to a judge accused of acting “maliciously and
corruptly,” the Court explained that the doctrine “is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or
corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty
to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.” Id. at 554 (quoting
Scott v. Stansfield, 3 L.R. Ex. 220, 223 (1868)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Imposing
something like a clear statement rule, the Court found in the legislative record “no clear indication
that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities,” and concluded by presuming
“that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.” Id. at 554–55.
71. See id. at 557. In Pierson, the Court held that police officers did not share the “absolute and
unqualified immunity” enjoyed by judges, but could invoke “good faith and probable cause” as a
defense to § 1983 actions. Id. at 555. This would, over time, broaden into a qualified immunity
protecting all public officials from liability for constitutional torts as long as their conduct did not
violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). For an argument that Pierson was driven
solely by policy concerns, see Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 Mo. L.
Rev. 123, 125–26 (1999) (“[Pierson used] a policy-driven analysis which was largely uninfluenced by
any controlling law . . . .”).
72. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427.
73. The Imbler Court noted that the first American case on the matter was Griffith v. Slinkard,
44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896), but did not explain what we were to make of the fact that Griffith was
decided twenty-five years after the enactment of § 1983, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421, a discrepancy noted
quite pointedly by critics of absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering
Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. Rev. 53, 108.
74. Johns explains that the American criminal justice system in 1871 was in the midst of a
transformation from a system in which private prosecutions were common to one in which crimes were
prosecuted primarily, and then exclusively, by public officials. Johns, supra note 73, at 108–13; see also
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 499 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In short,
prosecutorial immunity was indeed well established in the common law by the time the Supreme
Court decided Imbler; but it simply was not at the time that Congress enacted § 1983.
75. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424–27.
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concern that qualified immunity was simply an insufficient protection to
prevent the threat of § 1983 suits from undermining the performance of a
prosecutor’s duties. The Court began by observing that “[s]uch suits
could be expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will
transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of
76
improper and malicious actions to the State’s advocate.” Simply being
made to answer in court each time such a suit was brought would require
a prosecutor to divert “energy and attention” away from “the pressing
77
duty of enforcing the criminal law.” The Court noted that those suits
that survived the pleading stage would often require a “virtual retrial” of
the underlying criminal proceeding, and that even the honest prosecutor,
acting under “serious constraints” of time and information, might have
greater difficulty meeting the standards of qualified immunity than other
78
executive and administrative officials. This would create “unique and
intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor responsible annually for hundreds
79
of indictments and trials.” The Court closed its policy discussion by
agreeing with Judge Learned Hand that “it has been thought in the end
better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to
subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of
80
retaliation.”
The question then was how to “delineate the boundaries” of the
81
immunity. The Court seized upon the appellate court’s observation that
the prosecutor’s challenged conduct—most notably, the prosecutor’s
knowing use of perjurious testimony—was “an integral part of the
82
judicial process.” The Court explained that this focus on the “functional
nature of the activities,” rather than the prosecutor’s title or status, was
to illuminate when prosecutors enjoy the “absolute immunity associated
with the judicial process,” as opposed to the good faith defense that
83
accompanies investigative functions.

76. Id. at 425.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 425–26. The Court further reasoned that the possibility of personal liability for
prosecutors would ultimately inure to the detriment of criminal defendants, because prosecutors might
be motivated to withhold “evidence suggestive of innocence or mitigation.” Id. at 427 n.25. Judges
reviewing the fairness of the trial in appellate and collateral review might have their “focus . . . blurred
by even the subconscious knowledge that a post-trial decision in favor of the accused might result in
the prosecutor’s being called upon to respond in damages for his error or mistaken judgment.” Id. at 427.
80. Id. at 428 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
81. Id. at 430.
82. Id. (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 500 F.2d 1301, 1302 (9th Cir. 1974)).
83. Id.
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B. Focus on Function Rather than Title
This functional assessment of the official activities upon which a
§ 1983 plaintiff’s claims are predicated remains the touchstone of the
Court’s absolute immunity analysis. In Burns v. Reed, it was the basis for
the Court’s refusal to extend absolute immunity to prosecutors for
authorizing police officers to obtain a confession from a hypnotized
84
suspect, because this conduct was deemed investigative. On the other
hand, the Court did grant absolute immunity to the prosecutor for using
the very same confession at the probable cause hearing, because this
85
conduct was deemed prosecutorial.
Essential for evaluating the status of social workers in this
framework is that the Supreme Court has explicitly relied on this
functional analysis to extend absolute immunity to administrative
officials who lack the judicial or prosecutorial title but engage in
analogous tasks. In Butz v. Economou, the Court considered
entitlements to immunity arising out of an administrative proceeding in
which the Department of Agriculture sought to revoke or suspend a
86
company’s registration as a commodity futures commission merchant.
After attempting unsuccessfully to have the administrative proceeding
enjoined, the head of the company sought damages against the Secretary
and Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, the Judicial Officer and Chief
Hearing Officer, and the Agriculture Department Attorney who
prosecuted the enforcement proceeding, asserting that his constitutional
87
rights had been violated.
Beginning from the premise that qualified immunity “should be the
general rule for executive officials charged with constitutional
violations,” the Court proceeded to review the distinct status of those
officials “whose special functions require a full exemption from
88
liability.” The Court focused on parties participating in the judicial
process, reiterating previously articulated principles regarding the need
to insulate judges, grand jurors, prosecutors, and witnesses from a fear of
89
harassment or retaliation that would undermine their independence.
Providing a distinct rationale for extending absolute immunity to
those participants, the Court reasoned that the “safeguards built into the
judicial process tend to reduce the need for private damages actions as a

84. 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991).
85. Id. at 492 (“[A]ppearing at a probable-cause hearing is ‘intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process.’ It is also connected with the initiation and conduct of a
prosecution . . . .” (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430)).
86. 438 U.S. 478, 480 (1978).
87. Id. at 481–82.
88. Id. at 508.
89. See id. at 508–11.
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90

means of controlling unconstitutional conduct.” The Court cited “[t]he
insulation of the judge from political influence, the importance of
precedent in resolving controversies, the adversary nature of the process,
and the correctability of error on appeal” as “just a few of the many
91
checks on malicious action by judges.” Advocates, on the other hand,
are “restrained not only by their professional obligations, but by the
knowledge that their assertions will be contested by their adversaries in
92
open court.” Jurors are screened for bias, and witnesses are subject to
93
cross-examination and penalties for perjury. In the Court’s view “these
features of the judicial process tend to enhance the reliability of
information and the impartiality of the decisionmaking process,” thus
94
reducing the “need for individual suits to correct constitutional error.”
The Court held that adjudication within a federal administrative
agency shares enough of the characteristics of the judicial process to
produce the same immunities, as the role of a modern administrative
95
decisionmaker “is ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge,” and
“[t]he decision to initiate administrative proceedings against an
individual or corporation is very much like the prosecutor’s decision to
96
initiate or move forward with a criminal prosecution.” The Court thus
concluded that these officials, along with the agency attorney responsible
for presenting evidence during the administrative proceeding, were
entitled to absolute immunity from suit for adjudicating, initiating, or
97
conducting agency proceedings.
C. Applying the Framework to Child Welfare: “Functional
Analogies” and “Special Functions”
In the absence of a Supreme Court pronouncement on the scope of
98
immunity afforded to social workers, this framework yields two

90. Id. at 512.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 513.
96. Id. at 515.
97. Id. at 517.
98. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari on the issue, with two Justices dissenting from the
denial. See Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U.S. 1060, 1060, 1061 (1994). The federal appellate courts have
endeavored to apply the framework developed in Pierson, Imbler, Burns, and Butz to constitutional
claims arising from child dependency proceedings. See, e.g., Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Russell,
182 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1999). Citing Imbler and Burns, the Second Circuit commented that “[a]lthough
absolute immunity has traditionally been applied in favor of judges, prosecutors, and other judicial
officers, this logic dictates that anyone, even non-judicial officers (e.g., witnesses), must be assured
complete protection to the extent that they are fulfilling functions ‘closely related to the judicial
process.’” Id. at 97 (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494 (1991)). The majority of the circuits have
concluded that a social worker who initiates judicial proceedings to obtain custody of an endangered
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questions to guide the assessment: (1) whether social workers are
engaged in conduct that is functionally analogous to that of a prosecutor,
and (2) whether social workers are entrusted with “special functions
99
[that] require a full exemption from liability.”
The analogy between criminal prosecutions and child protection
proceedings is passable but imperfect. It rests on the idea that, like
prosecutors making charging decisions, social workers are entrusted with
the authority to exercise independent judgment in determining when to
100
initiate dependency proceedings and act as advocates for the state in a
101
capacity “intimately associated with the judicial [process].” At this level
of generality, the analogy holds, but a closer look at child protection
proceedings reveals important differences that undermine the analogy to
102
criminal prosecutions.

child engages in conduct that is functionally analogous to that of a prosecutor. See Ernst v. Child &
Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 495 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that it was joining the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits in extending absolute immunity to child welfare workers who initiate and
prosecute dependency proceedings); see also Beltran v. Santa Clara Cnty., 514 F.3d 906, 908–09 (9th
Cir. 2008) (en banc); Abdouch v. Burger, 426 F.3d 982, 989 (8th Cir. 2005); Rippy ex rel. Rippy v.
Hattaway, 270 F.3d 416, 422–23 (6th Cir. 2001); Millspaugh v. Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 937 F.2d
1172, 1176 (7th Cir. 1991); Vosburg v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 884 F.2d 133, 135 (4th Cir. 1989).
99. Butz, 438 U.S. at 508.
100. E.g., Meyers v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987).
The Ninth Circuit simply concluded, without much additional elaboration, that this “is not very
different from the responsibility of a criminal prosecutor.” Id. Other circuits have followed suit
without scrutinizing the analogy in its particulars. See, e.g., Ernst, 108 F.3d at 496 (quoting Meyers,
812 F.2d at 1157); Vosburg, 884 F.2d at 137 (quoting Meyers, 812 F.2d at 1157).
101. Ernst, 108 F.3d at 496 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
102. That is not to say that the circuits that have rejected the analogy have the better of the
doctrinal argument. The courts in this group, the minority among the circuits, have not been
considerably clearer in their reasoning. In van Emrik v. Chemung County Department of Social
Services, for example, Connie and Richard van Emrik brought suit against two child protective caseworkers responsible for the temporary removal of their seven-month-old daughter. 911 F.2d 863, 865–
66 (2d Cir. 1990). According to the court,
It is . . . undisputed that the [caseworkers] enjoy qualified immunity from liability for
damages if at the time of the pertinent episode it was not clear that the actions they took
violated established constitutional rights, or if it was objectively reasonable for them to
believe that their actions did not violate such rights as were then clearly established.
Id. The Second Circuit has never squarely addressed whether absolute immunity is available for social
workers who petition the court for custody of a child, leaving unanswered whether such a decision is
“functionally similar to a prosecutor’s decision to institute a criminal proceeding.” See Sutton v.
Tompkins Cnty., 617 F. Supp. 2d. 84, 98 (N.D.N.Y 2007). The First Circuit has similarly applied
qualified immunity to complaints against social workers, without addressing whether social workers
might be entitled to absolute immunity for conduct that could be characterized as prosecutorial. Cf.
Carter v. Lindgren, 502 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2007); Kauch v. Dep’t for Children, Youth, & Their
Families, 321 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2003); Hatch v. Dep’t for Children, Youth, & Their Families, 274 F.3d
12, 19–20 (1st Cir. 2001).
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Every state requires certain types of professionals to report
103
suspected child abuse; this will almost always include law enforcement
officials, doctors and other medical personnel, teachers, counselors, child
104
care providers, and other education workers. Upon receiving a report
of suspected child abuse from one of these mandated reporters—or from
105
an individual reporting on a voluntary basis —the appropriate social
106
the
services agency will assign a case worker to investigate
107
allegations.
The social worker begins by knocking on the family’s door and
attempting to interview the parent and other adults that live in the
household, as well as the child who is the subject of the report. If the
child attends school, the social worker may go to the school to
interview her. Depending on the nature of the allegations, the social
worker may also talk to school personnel, medical providers,
108
neighbors, or others who may have relevant information.
109

When the investigation substantiates the report of abuse, social
workers typically have two distinct types of authority. First, where the

103. Jose D. Alfaro, What Can We Learn from Child Abuse Fatalities: A Synthesis of Nine Studies,
in Protecting Children from Abuse and Neglect: Policy and Practice 219, 219 (Douglas J.
Besharov ed., 1988) [hereinafter Protecting Children].
104. For an example, see Ala. Code § 26-14-3(a) (LexisNexis 2009), which also extends the
obligation to clergy.
105. CPS receives roughly an equal number of reports from those who are required to submit
reports as it does from those who voluntarily submit reports. Waldfogel, supra note 2, at 112.
Mandated reporters are, on average, “better” reporters in the sense that they are more likely to report
cases that CPS subsequently determines to be genuine cases of abuse or neglect. Id.
106. Evaluating the extent to which it is appropriate for child protection agencies to conduct these
investigations, one researcher has noted,
Child protection agencies do not have the investigative technology, training, and resources
that are available to the police. They do not have crime laboratories, finger print
identification equipment, highly trained and skilled criminal investigators who are familiar
with the latest advances in forensic science. Child welfare social workers do not have the
legal training, knowledge of court procedures and rules of evidence and other education
that would enable them to effectively investigate and prosecute criminal behavior.
Duncan Lindsey, The Welfare of Children 173 (1994). On the other hand, they have “interviewing
and assessment skills that are useful in determining whether abuse has occurred.” Id.
107. E.g., Alaska Stat. § 47.17.030(b) (West 2010); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17a-101g(a) (West
2006). Some jurisdictions permit their hotline workers to screen out cases that seem inappropriate for
investigation. See Waldfogel, supra note 2, at 5, 114; see also Lukens, supra note 4, at 201 (“After a
report of suspected child abuse or neglect is made, either anonymously or by a mandated reporter, a
social worker from CPS makes an initial determination whether the information provided in the report
is sufficient to warrant further investigation. Most reports are screened out at this initial stage.”).
108. Amy Sinden, “Why Won’t Mom Cooperate?”: A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare
Proceedings, 11 Yale J.L. & Feminism 339, 344 (1999).
109. “Substantiation” refers to an agency determination, after an investigation, that a report of
abuse “is based upon accurate and reliable information that would lead a reasonable person to believe
that the child has been abused or neglected.” Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 4912(10) (West 2001 & Supp.
2010).

Aviel_62-HLJ-401.doc (Do Not Delete)

December 2010]

1/7/2011 12:16 PM

RESTORING EQUIPOISE TO CHILD WELFARE

421

110

child is thought to be in imminent risk of danger, a social worker may
111
conduct an emergency removal. Emergency removals have been
criticized as terrifying and traumatic for children and, in many cases,
112
unjustified by imminent danger. In theory, emergency removals must
113
be followed by a hearing within a specified period of time, but this
114
requirement has often been flouted.
Second, alternatively, social workers may initiate dependency
proceedings to transfer custody—legal, physical, or both—of the child
115
These dependency
from the parent or guardian to the State.

110. This determination generally must be supported by probable cause or the equivalent. Chill,
supra note 16, at 544 n.51; see, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.401(1)(b) (West 2010) (probable cause); cf.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17a-101g(b) (West 2006) (reasonable cause); Del. Code. Ann. tit. 16,
§ 907(a) (West 2003) (reasonable suspicion); 325 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/5 (West 2008) (reasonable
belief). But cf. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-821(B) (2007 & Supp 2010) (clear necessity).
111. See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 306(a)(2) (West 2008) (“[A social worker may] [t]ake
into and maintain temporary custody of a minor [if the social worker] has reasonable cause to believe
that the minor has an immediate need for medical care or is in immediate danger of physical or sexual
abuse or the physical environment poses an immediate threat to the child’s health or safety.”); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17a-101g(e) (West 2006); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-3-301(1) (2009); Va. Code Ann.
§ 16.1-251(A)(1) (2010) (authorizing the department of social services to take a child into immediate
custody upon obtaining an emergency removal order, which may be issued ex parte upon sworn
testimony that the child would be subjected to “imminent threat to life or health” to the extent that
“severe or irremediable injury” would be likely to result if the child were returned to or left in the
custody of his parents, and permitting emergency removal orders after the child is taken into
emergency custody); Va. Code Ann. § 63.2-1517(A)(1) (2007) (authorizing a physician, law
enforcement official, or child protective services worker to take a child into custody for up to seventytwo hours where a court order is not immediately obtainable).
112. Chill, supra note 16, at 540–41.
113. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-3-403(3.5) (West 2010) (seventy-two hours); Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. § 262.201(a) (West 2009) (fourteen days).
114. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 709 A.2d 1089, 1098 n.11 (Conn. 1998) (“[There is] widespread
evidence that the 10 day hearing requirement is an issue of great difficulty in the courts due to
crowded court calendars. We found evidence in interviews, focus groups, and a docket review of a
widespread practice of convening the initial 10 day hearing within the statutory guidelines, introducing
the parties into the record to formally initiate the hearing, and then continuing the hearing at a later
date. The range of time for the completion of 10 day hearings spanned from 10 days to six months.
This is a disturbing instance of compliance with the ‘letter’ rather than the ‘spirit’ of the law regarding
temporary custody hearings.” (quoting Edmund S. Muskie Inst., Univ. of Southern Maine, State of
Conn. Ct. Improvement Project Report 39 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
115. E.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 325 (West 2008). In some states this authority is not vested
exclusively in social workers; in Connecticut, for example,
Any selectman, town manager, or town, city or borough welfare department, any
probation officer, or the Commissioner of Social Services, the Commissioner of Children
and Families or any child-caring institution or agency approved by the Commissioner of
Children and Families, a child or such child’s representative or attorney or a foster parent of
a child, having information that a child or youth is neglected, uncared-for or dependent,
may file . . . a verified petition.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-129(a) (West 2009). In Pennsylvania, a petition alleging that a child is
dependent may be brought by “any person.” 42 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 6334 (West 2000 & Supp.
2010). In Louisiana, by contrast, a child welfare worker whose investigation reveals reasonable cause
to believe that a child is abused or neglected must report these findings to the District Attorney; the
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proceedings vary not only from state to state, but also from case to case;
they typically begin with a preliminary hearing, where the parent is
116
advised of the allegations and of their right to counsel and given the
opportunity to stipulate to a temporary transfer of custody to the State.
117
A guardian ad litem is appointed for the child.

District Attorney is given the authority to decide whether to file a petition to have the child
adjudicated to be in need of care. See Austin v. Borel, 830 F.2d 1356, 1357 (5th Cir. 1987).
116. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court considered whether an
indigent parent facing the termination of parental rights is entitled to counsel under the Due Process
Clause. 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981). Using the balancing test developed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976), the Court decided that the Constitution did not provide for a per se right to counsel,
but that in some circumstances parents involved in such proceedings might indeed have a
constitutional right to have an attorney provided for them. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31, 33–34. The states
have almost uniformly exceeded the constitutional floor, providing by statute for indigent parents to
have court-appointed counsel as a matter of course. See Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts,
and the Right to Free Counsel for Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services of Durham, 36 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 363, 367–68 (2005). The effectiveness of these
attorneys is an entirely different matter. One scholar-practitioner has observed:
While many parents are represented with tremendous competence by public defender and
legal services offices and by private attorneys, many others are appointed lawyers who only
accept these cases because they are the only cases they can get. Non-paying clients involved
in the family or juvenile court system because they have been accused of abusing or
neglecting their children are among the lowest-status clients a lawyer can have. The hourly
rate paid for this work is at the bottom of the scale and is capped at a level too low to allow
for effective representation in many cases. While these cases attract their share of dedicated,
zealous advocates, they attract more than their share of lawyers who are merely desperate
for work.
Among these lawyers, I have witnessed a startling lack of professionalism. The low pay
and the lack of commitment to the work inspires these lawyers to give little or no attention
to the cases. They rarely make an effort to speak with their clients out of court, even those
clients, such as incarcerated clients, who may not be readily available for consultation in
court. They often show up after a hearing is over, so that they can receive credit (and
therefore pay) for an appearance, regardless of their lack of actual participation. They
readily confess their open dislike for their clients to their adversaries, and their satisfaction
with court decisions strongly opposed by their clients. In their frustration, many parents
declare that they would have done better to represent themselves. While they would not
have done well, they might, indeed, have done better.
Emily Buss, Parents’ Rights and Parents Wronged, 57 Ohio St. L.J. 431, 437 (1996); see also Martin
Guggenheim, How Children’s Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 Nev. L.J. 805, 815 (2006) (“The legal
delivery system employed in New York City has ensured that most parents are inadequately
represented most of the time. Parents’ lawyers in New York City have become, almost without
exception, lawyers who practice exclusively in the Family Court with no law office of which to speak.
They belong to a panel of attorneys who accept assignment. They are in court virtually every day. But,
they do very little out of court work. In particular, they are rarely available to meet with their
clients.”); Vivek S. Sankaran, Innovation Held Hostage: Has Federal Intervention Stifled Efforts to
Reform the Child Welfare System?, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 281, 283 (2007) (“Social workers assigned
to work with families and attorneys representing parents and children are overwhelmed and rarely
provide meaningful assistance.”).
117. States must provide for these appointments as a condition of receiving federal funds. See
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, § 4(b)(2)(G), 88 Stat. 4, 7
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii), 5106a(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2006)); see also George S. Mahaffey
Jr., Role Duality and the Issue of Immunity for the Guardian Ad Litem in the District of Columbia,
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Where a parent chooses to contest the transfer, the court may take
evidence before issuing an order adjudicating the child neglected or
118
dependent. Such a determination will typically be accompanied by
119
what is initially a temporary transfer of custody to the State. In some
cases, only legal custody is transferred, giving the agency the authority to
monitor and supervise the family, provide (and usually require) various
forms of counseling or treatment, and make periodic assessments of
120
parental rehabilitation. In other cases, physical custody of the child
may be transferred to the agency, resulting in a kinship, foster care, or
121
institutional placement. State agencies must make “reasonable efforts”
to prevent the placement of a child in foster care and to reunite the child
122
with her family should removal be necessary. States are exempt from
undertaking such efforts in cases involving “aggravated circumstances,”
123
such as torture or the killing of another child. Dependency cases must
124
receive periodic review, at least once every six months. They conclude
when the child is either returned to her family or freed for adoption
125
following the termination of parental rights.
The question for the immunity analysis is whether this chronology
of events is sufficiently analogous to a criminal prosecution to conclude
that the social worker functions in the role of a prosecutor. At some level
of generality, it is certainly fair to say that the filing of a dependency

4 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 279, 280 (2002); Nat Stern & Karen Oehme, Toward a Coherent Approach to Tort
Immunity in Judicially Mandated Family Court Services, 92 Ky. L.J. 373, 398 (Winter 2003/2004).
118. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-129(g) (West 2009); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 405/1-5(1)
(West 2007); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6338(a) (West 2000).
119. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-129(b) (West 2009); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 405/2-10(2)
(West 2007).
120. E.g., 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6351(a)(2) (West 2000).
121. E.g., 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 405/2-10(2) (West 2007). As a matter of social work practice:
Three major directives are given to social workers involved in child protection. First, social
workers are instructed to provide services to abusing or neglectful parents in the parents’
own home. Removal of the child is a last resort: it is disruptive to the child and family and
costly for the state. Second, social workers are told to make sure that children do not wind
up in foster care “drift,” that is, remaining indefinitely in the foster care system and being
constantly moved from one home to another. Third, there is a legitimate privacy right that
families have. The unwarranted or premature intrusion of the government into the homes of
nonabusive families is improper and unconstitutional.
Daniel Pollack, Social Work and the Courts: A Casebook 38 (2d ed. 2003).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). These requirements are imposed as a
condition of receiving federal funds. See id. § 671(a) (“In order for a State to be eligible for payments
under this part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary . . . .”).
123. Id. § 671(a)(15)(D).
124. Id. § 675(5)(B).
125. See Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable Children, “Bad” Mothers, and
Statutory Deadlines in Parental Termination Proceedings, 11 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 176, 176 (2004)
(“Once a child is placed in foster care, the inexorable progress of the case will presumably lead to only
one of two options: return to the family of origin or termination of parental rights followed by
permanent placement in another family.”).
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petition by a child welfare worker initiates judicial proceedings of an
adversarial nature in which the child welfare worker acts as an advocate
for the state, making recommendations to a judge and urging the court to
126
accept and act upon those recommendations. And indeed,
[Dependency] proceedings . . . include most of the standard trappings
of the traditional adversarial model of dispute resolution. The state
must set forth its allegations in a petition and serve it on the parent.
Cases are heard by judges. Witnesses testify under oath. A court
reporter transcribes the proceedings. Rules of evidence apply, with
some exceptions. The parties may be represented by lawyers and may
127
appeal adverse decisions.

On closer inspection, however, the analogy to a criminal prosecution
becomes weaker. Scholars have observed that the procedural safeguards
128
that accompany judicial proceedings are often bypassed in “real life,”
and that for better or for worse, child welfare proceedings are
characterized by pervasively informal extra-judicial interactions,
129
decisions, and agreements. To obtain the perceived benefit of being
seen as cooperative, parents will often consent to “voluntary”
130
arrangements without the benefit of counsel or judicial oversight.
Amy Sinden, who has represented parents in civil child abuse and
neglect proceedings, notes that “social work norms and discourse
131
predominate in this setting.” Sinden emphasizes the key role that
“cooperation” plays in social work discourse: Because conflict is viewed
as harmful to children, “the mother accused of child abuse who creates
132
conflict by failing to ‘cooperate’ harms her child a second time.” While
the term implies collaboration among equals who share the same goals—
here, what is best for the children—it masks the significant coercive
power that the social worker, and the agency that backs her, can bring to
bear against a parent who disagrees with the caseworker’s view of what
steps should be taken. Emily Buss, who has represented children in

126. See supra notes 98–102.
127. Sinden, supra note 108, at 348.
128. Huntington, supra note 14, at 658.
129. See Buss, supra note 116, at 433–34 (explaining how the child welfare system exerts a great
deal of power outside the judicial system, because of coercive pressure on parents to submit to
“voluntary placement agreements”).
130. See id. In Nicholson v. Williams, a federal civil rights suit brought against the New York
Administration of Child Services (“ACS”) by women whose children had been removed from their
care solely based on domestic violence against the mother. 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 163–64 (E.D.N.Y.
2002). The Director testified that “there were instances where it might be appropriate to remove a
child to ‘motivate’ the mother to cooperate with services offered by ACS.” Id. at 215. Defendants also
admitted that some removals “are never brought before a court because mothers will usually agree to
attend whatever services ACS demands once their children have been in foster care for a few days.”
Id.
131. Sinden, supra note 108, at 353.
132. Id. at 354.
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abuse and neglect proceedings, confirms that this power is not lost on the
parents being urged to cooperate: Parents enter into “voluntary”
placement agreements, pursuant to which children may be placed in
foster care for up to six months, “for fear that failing to do so will only
add the curse of ‘uncooperative’ to the list of their sins when the case
133
comes to court.”
The divergence here from criminal proceedings is notable: Criminal
defendants are simply not expected to cooperate with prosecutors in the
manner that is demanded for parents accused of abuse and neglect. To
134
be sure, plea bargaining in criminal cases is pervasive, but it simply is
not analogous to these extra-judicial agreements between parents and
child welfare workers. An accused entering into an agreement with the
prosecutor to plead guilty in exchange for a six-month sentence would
135
have the right to effective assistance of counsel. Before accepting the
guilty plea, the court would have to provide specific advisements to the
136
defendant and ascertain that the plea was knowing and voluntary.
These protections are absent for a parent who agrees to be separated
from her child for six months under “voluntary” placement agreements.
At first blush, it seems that the widespread reliance among child
protection agencies on informal agreements has no bearing on the
immunity analysis, because these out-of-court arrangements, by their
very terms, would not be considered “intimately associated” with the
judicial process; as discussed previously, social workers therefore would
137
not receive absolute immunity for that conduct. But in the child welfare
system, the discourse of cooperation retains its force even after legal
138
proceedings have been formally initiated. It remains a critical aspect of
139
a social worker’s assessment of a parent’s fitness, and judges often
140
defer to social workers once these cases get to court.

133. Buss, supra note 116, at 434; see also Roberts, supra note 17, at 66 (“Caseworkers are
instructed to treat the degree of parents’ cooperation as evidence of the child’s risk of harm. When
reported families do not cooperate with the investigating agency, their case is more likely to be
referred to court.”).
134. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1909
(1992) (“Most criminal prosecutions are settled without a trial.”).
135. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
136. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1969); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468
(1938).
137. See supra notes 98–102.
138. See Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 489–90 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[The County] found
Ernst to be uncooperative, antagonizing, and unwilling to acknowledge her parenting problems. . . . As
[the] caseworkers became increasingly frustrated with Ernst, they sought and obtained restrictions on
her visits with Susanne. Ultimately, with the approval of the Chester County Court of Common Pleas
and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, they changed [the] goal for Susanne from family reunification
to long-term foster placement.”).
139. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 66 (“More critical than the mother’s attitude toward her child
is the mother’s attitude toward the caseworker. Parents are expected to be remorseful and submissive.
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What makes this dynamic even more difficult to analogize to a
criminal prosecution is that it is the social worker and her agency who
are entrusted with providing the family with the services they need to be
141
reunited. If the basis for the dependency petition is that the parent is
incapacitated by addiction or is having anger management issues, it is the
agency’s role to provide the parent with drug treatment or parenting
142
classes. It is the parent, however, who is up against an unforgiving
clock. This is because of the 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act, which
was enacted to remedy the problem of “foster care drift,” or children
languishing for years in foster care without being reunited with their
143
families or freed for adoption. Under the Act, as a condition of
receiving federal funding, states must impose a presumption that a child
who has been in foster care for fifteen of twenty-two consecutive months
will be freed for adoption, and the biological parent’s rights are
144
terminated. In contrast, throughout a criminal proceeding, it is the
prosecutor who is running against the clock to comply with speedy trial
145
rights.
Unlike a prosecutor, the social worker who files a dependency
petition does more than just advocate for custody of an endangered
child: She also must provide the parent with rehabilitative services,
monitor the parent for progress, and initiate termination proceedings for
parents who are unable to demonstrate improvement within the fifteen
month period, working a radical and permanent transformation not just
146
on the wrongdoing parent, but also on the lives of the affected children.

Any disagreement with the agency’s proposed plan is reported as evidence of unwillingness to
reform.”).
140. Sinden, supra note 108, at 353.
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2006) (“[R]easonable efforts shall be made [by the agency] to
preserve and reunify families . . . prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or
eliminate the need for removing the child from the child’s home; and . . . to make it possible for a child
to safely return to the child’s home.”).
142. See 42 U.S.C. § 629a(1)(E) (2006) (“The term ‘family preservation services’ means services
for children and families designed to help families . . . at risk or in crisis, including . . . services designed
to improve parenting skills (by reinforcing parents’ confidence in their strengths, and helping them to
identify where improvement is needed and to obtain assistance in improving those skills) with respect
to matters such as child development, family budgeting, coping with stress, health, and
nutrition . . . .”).
143. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 2 & 42 U.S.C.).
144. 42 U.S.C § 675(5)(E) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
145. And possibly statutes of limitation. For an overview of a criminal defendant’s constitutional
and statutory rights to a speedy trial, see Steven D. Feldman, Speedy Trial, 84 Geo. L.J. 1022, 1022–39
(1996).
146. See Garrison, supra note 12, at 595 (“[B]ecause of high caseloads and rapid staff turnover,
case workers often failed to offer any meaningful assistance to parents or children . . . .”); Ross, supra
note 125, at 202 (“If the agency drags its feet, and fails to provide the parent with needed resources
and support, fifteen months are likely to be consumed without any discernable change in the parent’s
circumstances.”).
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These aspects of a social worker’s role are without analogue in the
district attorney’s office.
Thus, although social workers do indeed, in most jurisdictions, have
the authority to initiate judicial proceedings against parents thought to
be abusive or neglectful and to exercise independent discretion in
making these decisions, they are enmeshed in a relationship with these
parents that is in some ways fundamentally different from interactions
between a prosecutor and a criminal defendant. Without guidance from
the Supreme Court, it is difficult to tell how many points of similarity are
necessary to build an analogy that triggers absolute immunity, or
whether the analogy should be assessed on the basis of the child
147
protection process as it exists de jure or de facto. In short, the strength
of the analogy to prosecutorial conduct has been underexamined and,
upon inspection, is less than compelling.
But the “functionally analogous” inquiry is itself difficult to take
seriously in some of its manifestations. The idea that, by layering analogy
upon inference, the Court can effectuate congressional intent with
respect to certain types of public officials that did not exist when § 1983
148
was enacted is a truly tenuous fiction. What Imbler v. Pachtman so
unmistakably communicates, despite the Court’s protestations to the
149
is that absolute immunity is predicated on policy
contrary,
150
considerations, such as an assessment of the pressures faced by a
particular type of official; the importance of professional judgment to the
exercise of that official’s duties; and the threat to public welfare posed by
efforts to harass, retaliate, or intimidate the official in the vigorous

147. See Justine A. Dunlap, Judging Nicholson: An Assessment of Nicholson v. Scoppetta,
82 Denv. U. L. Rev. 671, 677–78 (2005) (“Courts have determined that removal itself is harmful and
justified only after a balancing of the harms that will occur absent removal—as have legislatures,
through statutes and legislative history, and agencies, through written policies. Yet removal—often on
an ex parte emergency basis—is the rule in practice. The perennial battle between what is right and
what actually happens—the law on the books versus the law as it looks—is often fought in child
protection proceedings.”).
148. As at least one circuit has acknowledged, state-employed child welfare workers did not exist
in 1871 when § 1983 was enacted. See Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 493 (3d Cir. 1997).
The Third Circuit had the benefit of Justices Thomas and Scalia’s dissent from an opinion denying
certiorari in Hoffman v. Harris, in which the two Justices criticized lower courts for having overlooked
the necessary historical inquiry. 511 U.S. 1060, 1062 (1994) (Thomas, J. joined by Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. See 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976) (“[Each grant of immunity] was predicated upon a considered
inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests
behind it. . . . [Our result] must be determined in the same manner.”). The Court has continued to
insist that its immunity cases reflect an attempt to discern congressional intent, rather than to make
policy, insisting that its appropriate role is “to interpret the intent of Congress in enacting § 1983, not
to make a freewheeling policy choice.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986).
150. See Alan Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional
Balancing Tests, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 261, 271 n.50 (1995) (reviewing scholarly work that characterizes the
Court’s immunity jurisprudence as “unabashedly policy-based”).
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151

discharge of her duties.
Butz v. Economou restates this as an
assessment of whether a certain class of official performs a “special
152
function” that might require “full exemption from liability.”
The federal courts have embraced this prong of the immunity
analysis, speaking largely in chorus about the need to facilitate social
workers’ independent judgment by eliminating the threat of retaliatory
lawsuits from resentful parents. The Third Circuit, for example, has
reasoned,
Like a prosecutor, a child welfare worker must exercise independent
judgment in deciding whether or not to bring a child dependency
proceeding, and such judgment would likely be compromised if the
worker faced the threat of personal liability for every mistake in
judgment. Certainly, we want our child welfare workers to exercise
care in deciding to interfere in parent-child relationships. But we do
not want them to be so overly cautious, out of fear of personal liability,
153
that they fail in situations in which children are in danger.
154

Other circuits have expressed virtually identical concerns.
The federal courts’ concern that the threat of personal liability will
unduly influence social worker decisions about tense and possibly
dangerous situations has yielded discussions of the policy considerations
surrounding absolute immunity that are remarkably consistent with each
155
other, and are also consistent with the messages of Imbler and Butz.

151. 424 U.S. at 423–28.
152. 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978).
153. Ernst, 108 F.3d at 496. The court hypothesized that without absolute immunity, suits against
social workers would occur with even greater frequency than suits against prosecutors, as “[p]arents
involved in seemingly unjustified dependency proceedings are likely to be even more resentful of state
interference in the usually sacrosanct parent-child relationship than are defendants of criminal
prosecution.” Id. at 496–97.
154. The Fourth Circuit, for example, has asserted,
Like a prosecutor, a social worker must exercise her best judgment and discretion in
deciding when to file a Removal Petition. The welfare of the state’s children would be
jeopardized if social workers had to weigh their decision in terms of their potential personal
liability. In short, the denial of absolute immunity here has the potential to adversely affect
the efficient functioning of the state’s child welfare system. Additionally, the chances are
high that suits against the social workers would occur with some degree of regularity.
Parents, resentful of and humiliated by an attempt to usurp their rights, would likely
channel their frustration “into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to the
State’s advocate.”
Vosburg v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 884 F.2d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425).
155. See, e.g., Meyers v. Contra Costa Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir.
1987) (“The social worker must make a quick decision based on perhaps incomplete information as to
whether to commence investigations and initiate proceedings against parents who may have abused
their children. The social worker’s independence, like that of a prosecutor, would be compromised
were the social worker constantly in fear that a mistake could result in a time-consuming and
financially devastating civil suit.”); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[Social
workers] are responsible for the prosecution of child neglect and delinquency petitions in the Michigan
courts. It is their responsibility, and others in similar positions, to protect the health and well-being of
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But like Imbler and Butz, uniformly absent from these discussions is any
attempt to ascertain whether—and, if so, to what extent—social workers
are indeed influenced in their decisionmaking by a fear of personal
156
liability. In other words, we might agree that the case for extending
absolute immunity to social workers is as strong as the case for
prosecutors and agency officials, but wonder how strong that latter case
is.
Were the courts to turn to the scholarly literature for assistance,
they would find a bewildering disagreement as to the readiness of social
157
workers to intervene in the families they are charged with assisting.
This matters immensely for the immunity analysis. If one accepts the
view of social workers as interventionist and overzealous, it makes little
sense to conclude that social workers systematically fail to act, much less
that the failure is caused by a fear of liability. After all, since DeShaney,
it has been perfectly clear that they will not be held liable for not
158
acting. If, on the other hand, one accepts the view that social workers
are too timid and do too little to protect the children in their charge, it
makes quite a bit of sense to ask why and to inquire whether the timidity
159
is caused by a fear of liability. In the following Part, I attempt to delve
into these questions.

the children of Michigan. They must be able to perform the necessary tasks to achieve this goal
without the worry of intimidation and harassment from dissatisfied parents.”); Mazor v. Shelton,
637 F. Supp. 330, 334–35 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (“It is essential that social workers perform their duties to
minors without fear of intimidation from dissatisfied parents. If courts allow retaliatory suits, social
workers would be inclined to act only in cases in which they are absolutely certain that the alleged
conduct occurred. But absolute certainty is not always available in situations where the circumstances
require an immediate decision to remove a child from a home. Without the benefit of immunity, social
workers’ attention would shift from protecting abused or neglected children to avoiding vexatious
litigation. This shift could threaten the health and safety of an abused or neglected minor.”).
156. And even for those decisions addressing social worker immunity after DeShaney, there have
been no acknowledgments that social worker liability runs in only one direction, attaching only to
affirmative conduct. The Third Circuit, expressing the concern that a fear of liability might cause social
workers to fail to intervene in situations in which children are in danger, provided a “cf” citation to
DeShaney, with no further elaboration. Ernst, 108 F.3d at 496.
157. See supra note 16.
158. See supra notes 38–40.
159. Some of the researchers who are talking to social workers are chasing down a different grail,
exploring the reasons for the crisis of turnover in child welfare agencies. Although the reasons are
multifaceted, we know that turnover creates a vicious cycle: Child welfare workers leave in part
because of high caseloads, and the agencies often have trouble filling those vacancies, requiring
remaining caseworkers to carry the overload. Families that depend on these agencies not only face
new caseworkers with whom they not only have no relationship, but who are even more overworked
than their predecessors. As one report has summarized:
The costs of turnover in child welfare are great. . . . [T]herapeutic relationships with
vulnerable children and families need to be reestablished, workloads are increased as staff
cover caseloads until a new worker can be hired and trained, and meanwhile the ASFA time
clock continues to tick and the child and family continues [sic] to need vital services to heal
as they face the challenge of their lifetime.
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III. Assessing Overdeterrence as a Basis for Absolute
Immunity’s Policy Rationale
One might be underwhelmed by the strength of the prosecutor
analogy and yet be moved by the assumption outlined in the preceding
Part: the notion that absolute immunity for social workers is sound
policy. As the preceding discussion makes clear, federal courts have
rested their immunity decisions on the intuition that social workers will
be less likely to intervene on behalf of endangered children if they have
to weigh their professional decisions in terms of personal liability. This
notion is essential for our present purpose of evaluating the possibility
that absolute immunity can correct DeShaney’s perverse inequity of
incentives.
But is it true? One possible response is that it need not be any truer
for social workers than for legislators, judges, and prosecutors. We might
note that the Supreme Court, in the nearly sixty years since first
recognizing absolute immunity as a defense to certain § 1983 actions, has
never required any sort of evidence to support the notion that these
officials would be more timid in the discharge of their duties were they
160
not protected by absolute immunity. The Court has simply assumed it
161
to be self-evident. The scholarly commentary on official liability has
been considerably more cautious, but much of it has accepted at least
“[t]he possibility that excessive liability might chill decisive government
162
action.”

Am. Pub. Human Servs. Ass’n, Report from the 2004 Child Welfare Workforce Survey: State
Agency Findings 14 (2005).
This is not entirely unrelated to the inquiry explored here. While the immunity discussion
centers on the extent to which fear of liability may influence individual decisions in particular cases, or
create defaults for case management decisionmaking, the crisis of social worker turnover suggests a
secondary problem: To what extent does fear of liability motivate social workers to quit the
profession? One study asked child welfare supervisors to indicate whether particular challenges faced
by social workers—such as excessive workloads or concerns about physical safety—were “highly
problematic,” “somewhat problematic,” or “not problematic” in contributing to the problem of social
worker turnover. Id. at 37. When asked about vulnerability to legal liability, 16% of supervisors
responded that it was “somewhat problematic,” and 9% responded that it was “highly problematic”;
75% responded that it was “not problematic.” Id.
160. See Chen, supra note 150, at 264 n.14 (“[T]here is no empirical basis for any of the Court’s
underlying assumptions [about official immunity].”).
161. Id.
162. Bruce A. Peterson & Mark E. Van Der Weide, Susceptible to Faulty Analysis: United States v.
Gaubert and the Resurrection of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447, 482 (1997);
id. at 482 n.131 (“Government officials . . . are excessively risk-averse if faced with potential
punishment for their torts.”); see also Richard H. Fallon Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, NonRetroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1792 (1991) (“Doctrines imposing
personal liability on public officials can easily lead to overdeterrence. Officials may tend to be highly
risk-averse with respect to threats of personal liability. There is little likelihood of personal gain from
pursuing a course that poses even a small risk of being held unconstitutional, while the cost of being
sued—even if the suit is ultimately unsuccessful—may be enormous.”); Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the
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Perhaps the assumption is sound for prosecutors and caseworkers
alike. Peter Schuck, in his influential work on suing government,
163
acknowledged that empirical evidence was sparse, but that “the most
plausible assumptions about official motivation” suggest “a strategy of
164
personal risk minimization.” Schuck argues that the motivation to
minimize the personal costs of particular courses of action is so strong
that public actors will, in extreme cases, “be prepared to sacrifice all
social benefits in order to reduce even slightly the personal costs that a
165
decision entails.” Interestingly, to illustrate the sort of socially costly
decision a public actor will make to reduce her own legal exposure,
Schuck gives the example of a social worker who prematurely removes
children from troubled families, rather than risk being sued on behalf of
166
an abused child. But this example is one of a number of time capsules
167
from the pre-DeShaney era. After DeShaney, the decision to do
nothing is beyond challenge, but the decision to act remains subject to
168
multiple forms of constitutional scrutiny: Did the social worker act so

Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 17, 31
(2000); John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 Va. L. Rev. 47,
74 (1998) (“‘[S]treet level’ government officers may be more likely than their private counterparts to
be excessively inhibited by the threat of liability.”); Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for
Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 Wash. L. Rev. 635, 640 (1982); Michael Wells &
Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 201,
240–41 (1984). But see Jonathan M. Freiman, The Problem of Qualified Immunity: How Conflating
Microeconomics and Law Subverts the Constitution, 34 Idaho L. Rev. 61, 71 (1997) (“[P]otential
liability is only part of the individual’s calculus at the decisional moment. . . . Individual behavioral
variation is inevitable no matter how well the microeconomic model predicts the mode.”).
163. And perhaps intrinsically difficult to obtain reliably—he notes the existence of a phenomena
called “the Hawthorne effect,” in which merely calling attention to the risk of liability “might
exaggerate its perceived magnitude.” Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for
Official Wrongs 69–70 (1983).
164. Id. at 68. Schuck argues,
[O]fficials tend to reject any course of action that would drive their personal costs above
some minimum level, what I call a “duty threshold.” . . . The duty threshold . . . is defined
by one’s idiosyncratic attitudes toward (and trade-offs among) certain values and interests,
some altruistic, some more narrowly self-interested, that economic models of choice cannot
readily take into account—feelings of professionalism; moral duty; programmatic mission;
fear of criticism, discipline, or reprisals for self-protective behavior; concern for professional
reputation; habituation to routine; personal convenience; and the like.
Id. (footnote omitted).
165. Id. at 70.
166. Id. at 75; see also Douglas J. Besharov, The Need to Narrow the Grounds for State
Intervention, in Protecting Children, supra note 103, at 47, 83 (stating that “most observers would
agree” with Schuck’s characterization).
167. Likewise writing before DeShaney, Dean Knudsen argues that judgments of liability against
social workers for failing to remove a child from danger will cause CPS workers to protect themselves
by removing children unnecessarily. See Dean D. Knudsen, Child Protective Services: Discretion,
Decisions, Dilemmas 158 (1988).
168. See Jeffries, supra note 162, at 75 (“Persons injured by affirmative misconduct can usually
state a cause of action. The causal connection between harm to the plaintiff and the act of an
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precipitously as to deprive the family of the liberty interest in family
integrity? Was the process so irregular as to constitute a violation of
169
procedural due process? This imbalance means that after DeShaney, a
strategy of personal risk minimization would entail doing as little as
possible: delaying intervention, choosing less intrusive forms of
intervention, giving parents the benefit of the doubt, and construing
170
uncertainty against removal. The question is whether this sketch even
resembles today’s child welfare system.
For some prominent critics of the child welfare system, the answer is
171
yes. Elizabeth Bartholet, for example, has characterized the child
welfare system as one in which “[w]e try to avoid removing children from
their families at all costs and to return children who are removed as
172
quickly as possible.” She asserts that “the state is too reluctant to
respond to serious child maltreatment with coercive measures, to remove
children from harm’s way, and to terminate parental rights so that
173
children can be moved on to safe, nurturing families.” Richard Gelles
and Ira Schwartz argue that the child welfare system is premised upon an
ideological commitment to the notion that children should remain with
their biological parents, and that the system prioritizes parents’ rights at

identifiable defendant is typically clear. In contrast, those injured by a failure to act find it difficult to
bring suit. The causal connection between the plaintiff’s injury and an officer’s inaction may be
indirect and obscure. . . . In consequence, the risk of being sued for erroneous or improper action is
vastly greater than is the risk of being sued for erroneous or improper (and perhaps equally costly)
inaction. This imbalance increases the incentive to protect oneself by doing less.”).
169. See supra notes 58–64.
170. This is what a strategy of personal risk minimization would look like when the risk we are
speaking of is the risk of liability. What DeShaney left untouched, and what no court could eliminate,
is the fear of other risks faced by social workers, such as job discipline or adverse publicity stemming
from the death of a child left with, or returned to, his biological parents. Fear of these consequences
may continue to influence social worker decisionmaking in favor of intervention and removal. The
federal courts have not even acknowledged these countervailing forces operating upon social worker
decisionmaking, much less articulated any formula or method for balancing the fear of liability for
unwarranted intervention against the fear of adverse publicity for failing to timely intervene.
However, some commentators continue to speak of fear of job discipline, fear of liability, and fear of
adverse publicity as factors that can be grouped together to produce “unnecessary removals” in a
phenomenon that could be described as “defensive social work.” See Chill, supra note 16, at 542 (citing
Douglas J. Besharov, Protecting Abused and Neglected Children: Can Law Help Social Work?, 7 Child
Abuse & Neglect 4, 421–34 (1983)). Post-DeShaney, these fears run in different directions, and their
effects on social worker decisionmaking must be disaggregated to be meaningful.
171. Some of these characterizations of the child welfare system obviously cannot serve as
evidence that caseworkers fail to intervene as warranted for fear of liability. Indeed, Gelles, Schwartz,
and Dwyer all suggest substantive ideological reasons for what they perceive as caseworkers’ timidity.
But in describing caseworkers as systematically reluctant to remove children from their homes, their
portrayal is at least reconcilable with the federal courts’ concern about overly cautious caseworkers
whose hesitation to intervene may place vulnerable children at risk. See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 442–
67; Gelles & Schwartz, supra note 16.
172. See Bartholet, supra note 16, at 24 (“Family preservation has always been the dominant
modus operandi in the child welfare system.”).
173. Id. at 235 (describing the views of family preservation critics).
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174

the expense of child protection. James Dwyer asserts that social
workers have an “adult-centered orientation” and “view their ‘clients’ as
175
the dysfunctional parents, not the maltreated children.” Dwyer writes:
In discussing policy reforms with local and state-level CPS officials in
Virginia, I most often heard objections couched in terms of parents’
rights rather than in terms of child welfare. When I give presentations
to CPS social workers and directors and I raise this concern, there are
always a couple who approach me afterwards, and, in hushed tones, say
something to the effect of “it is so true; CPS is all about helping parents
and giving them every last chance, not about doing what is best for the
176
children.”

However, the child welfare system has been criticized just as
vehemently for intervening too readily and too intrusively, for riding
roughshod over the constitutional rights of parents, particularly parents
of color, and for disregarding the trauma and stress of family
177
separation. Although the overwhelming majority of children in the
child welfare system—about 89%—remain in their homes, rather than
178
being placed in foster care, critics see a system that is eager to remove
children from their parents and does so without careful evaluation of the
costs and benefits. Theo Liebmann, criticizing what he views as
amorphous and overly permissive removal standards, notes that removal
from a parent has been shown to present risk of various forms of
separation anxiety, depression, and other mental health problems, and
asserts that “the decision to remove a child is made in a vacuum utterly
179
devoid of these very real facts.” Paul Chill, focusing his critique on the
procedural defects of emergency removals, has also noted the “harsh
human impact” of removal and has argued that the number of
180
unnecessary removals is “large and growing.”

174. See Gelles & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 99–102. They argue that the child welfare system is
predicated on seven core beliefs, including the beliefs that parents want to and can change their
abusive and neglectful behavior, that change can be achieved if there are sufficient resources, that a
safe and lasting family reunification can be achieved with sufficient resources, and that children do
best when raised by their biological parents. Id.
175. Dwyer, supra note 16, at 455.
176. Id.
177. Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. Mich. J.L.
Reform 683, 772–74 (2001); Huntington, supra note 14, at 656–63; see also Roberts, supra note 17, at
225 (stating that African American children are overrepresented in the child welfare system, which
further disadvantages black Americans “as a group”).
178. Patricia L. Kohl, Casey-CSSP Alliance for Racial Equity in Child Welfare,
Unsuccessful In-Home Child Welfare Service Plans Following a Maltreatment Investigation:
Racial and Ethnic Differences 5 (2007); see also Waldfogel, supra note 2, at 208 (“[O]nly a small
share of the children reported are subsequently removed from their homes. Indeed, most children
reported to CPS receive no intervention beyond an initial screening or investigation . . . .”).
179. Theo Liebmann, What’s Missing from Foster Care Reform? The Need for Comprehensive,
Realistic, and Compassionate Removal Standards, 28 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 141, 148 (2007).
180. Chill, supra note 16, at 541–42.
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At times the preservationist portraits of the child welfare system are
virtually unrecognizable from those painted by the protectionists,
although they are certainly no less condemnatory. Consider the following
statement made by Martin Guggenheim, a prominent preservationist,
describing what he views as the attitude towards parents involved in the
system:
It is the element of hatred that I wish to mention for a minute. There is
a shocking presumption generated by fear, by otherness, by a lot of
things—that the parents of children in foster care are bad for their
children. They don’t love them enough or they don’t have the ability
enough to raise them well. And I’m here to say that in my 30 years of
work in this field, that is the most despicable slander of all, and the
181
most difficult falsity to refute.

This presents a remarkable contrast to the experiences relayed by
Dwyer, who reports that an official attested that her agency would never
seek to terminate parental rights without pursuing rehabilitation and
182
reunification, because “we don’t give up on parents . . . you never know
183
when someone might change.” Other researchers have also found that
[o]ne of the unique qualities of the child welfare social worker, derived
from professional training, is that he or she often focuses on the
strengths of the parents even in severe abuse cases. . . . [A]t each stage
of the decision-making process caseworkers tend to favor the least
stigmatizing interpretation of available information and the least
184
coercive disposition.

How can we reconcile these competing views of the child welfare
system? The answer, I think, is that underlying these seemingly
conflicting visions is the painful truth that agencies all over the country
are too burdened with excessive caseloads and inadequate funding to
185
apply a sensitive filter to reports of child abuse. Some will err on the

181. Symposium, The Rights of Parents with Children in Foster Care: Removals Arising from
Economic Hardship and the Predictive Power of Race, 6 N.Y. City L. Rev. 61, 74 (2003).
182. While states are required to pursue reunification in the majority of cases, they are exempted
from such efforts in cases involving “aggravated circumstances” such as abandonment, torture, or the
killing of another child. See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 437–38.
183. Id. at 454. For an interesting perspective on a bias towards parents in the criminal justice
system, see Jennifer M. Collins, Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet: The Criminal Justice System’s
Romanticization of the Parent-Child Relationship, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 131 (2007) (asserting that in cases
of violence against children, parental offenders are systematically treated better by the criminal justice
system than are extrafamilial offenders, due to the idealization of the parent-child bond). Collins notes
an “identification phenomenon,” quoting frustrated prosecutors who have observed that “juries
identify with the accused, believing any parent can make a mistake. . . . Most members of the general
public have been stressed themselves by child care responsibilities and feel some sense of sympathy for
the abuser, who is seen as having lost control.” Id. at 154.
184. Lindsey, supra note 106, at 174 n.77.
185. See, e.g., Waldfogel, supra note 2, at 26–27. Waldfogel’s study of Boston case records
suggests both that “the American child protective services system is investigating many families
unnecessarily,” and that “the system does not always intervene aggressively enough in very high-risk
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side of intervention; some will err on the side of hesitation; all will
188
err, even more frequently than whatever might be the inevitable
baseline rate of error inherent in any enterprise that is not only
investigative, but also predictive. These predictions will be wrong in both
directions, offering ample fodder both for the protectionists to decry
failures to intervene and for the preservationists to decry unnecessary
interventions that cause harm and do no good. This debate is about the
better way to be wrong, whether social workers should err on the side of
inaction or err on the side of intervention.
My objective here is not to resolve this debate but to point out that
that rejecting absolute immunity in a post-DeShaney world is to accept
that only erring on the side of intervention is redressable, and that only
erring on the side of intervention poses a threat to a social worker’s
personal liability. This produces a bias for inaction in the legal
framework that should make us uncomfortable, even though we do not

cases.” Id. She observes that the system suffers from both overinclusion (families in the system who
should not be there) and underinclusion (families who should be receiving child protective services
who are not). Id. at 84–85. As she puts it:
In too many high-risk cases, repeated warnings are ignored or misread, and children are left
to suffer at the hands of cruel or incompetent parents. And in too many low-risk cases,
struggling families receive only a heavy-handed investigation, but no real services to help
them become better caregivers for their children.
Id. at 208.
186. For an excellent overview of studies confirming the very low rate of reliability in the selection
of children for placement in foster care, which causes children who need placement to be left in their
homes while children with lesser placement needs were removed from their families, see Lindsey,
supra note 106, at 133–38. One study suggested,
[J]udgments of protective service workers about the severity of child abuse and neglect
cases . . . varied as a function of the severity of social and economic problems in the areas
served by protective service staff. Specifically, workers in district offices with more sever
caseloads judged vignettes provided by the author as less severe. Conversely, workers from
offices with less severe caseloads judged the vignettes as more severe.
Stein & Rzepnicki, supra note 1, at 8 (citing Isabel Wolock, Community Characteristics and Staff
Judgments in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 18 No. 2 Social Work Research & Abstracts 9–15
(1982)).
187. See, e.g., Kurt Mundorff, Children as Chattel: Invoking the Thirteenth Amendment to Reform
Child Welfare, 1 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 131, 153–54 (2003) (“[The] lack of coherent
standards results in massive inconsistencies within agencies and within the system as a whole. . . . Some
supervisors were cautious about removals, conducting them only after a careful investigation. Some
ordered them on only the slightest allegations and conducted the investigation subsequently, if at all.
Each investigative unit developed its own culture, its own definitions, and its own standards for
investigation. These inconsistencies are reflected in local and national child protection data. One study
compared the data of twenty-eight states and found tremendous variation between the rates of
substantiation and the type of maltreatment found.” (footnotes omitted)).
188. At least one scholar has argued that one type of error actually causes the other. See Besharov,
supra note 166, at 48 (“The system is so overburdened with cases of insubstantial or unproven risk to
children that it does not respond forcefully to situations where children are in real danger.”).
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know how responsive social workers are to this bias. It is true that we
have virtually no empirical evidence confirming that social workers fail
to act out of fear of personal liability, but the assumption is at least
plausible, and the possibility that even a small handful of endangered
children who should be removed from their homes would suffer from a
social worker’s personal liability calculus is deeply troubling. Until an
appropriate empirical study disproves the federal courts’ assumption that
the possibility of such liability—attenuated as it would be under a
qualified immunity regime—would cause hesitation, delay, and inaction
in child welfare professionals, we should strive for parity in the legal
consequences that attend caseworker decisionmaking.
There is insight to be gleaned from the very persistence of the
scholarly dispute over the wisdom and efficacy of state intervention in
troubled families. The fact that scholars cannot agree on whether
caseworkers should be more or less reluctant to intervene itself supports
parity. We can expect that an observer who views the child welfare
system as overly intrusive would be resistant to the suggestion that
unwarranted and damaging interventions would be insulated from
federal review for constitutional error. After all, preservationist scholars
have been vocal about the harms that flow from unwarranted
190
and some of them have explicitly addressed the
intrusions,
191
constitutional implications of these intrusions. But it is quite another
matter to propose that making caseworkers personally liable for action
but not for omission is an appropriate mechanism with which to reduce
these interventions—that federal liability should by design cause child
welfare workers to hesitate before intervening, where the post-DeShaney
landscape provides no comparable reason to be fearful about the legal
consequences of inaction. Such a proposal could be justified only by a
high degree of certainty that child welfare workers systematically overintervene and rarely, if ever, fail to act where warranted. As discussed
above, the literature simply does not support that type of certainty.

189. The National Center of Child Abuse and Neglect (“NCCAN”) invited public comment on
proposed funding priorities for child maltreatment research for fiscal years 1997–2001. Children’s
Bureau/National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect Proposed Research Priorities for Fiscal Years
1997–2001, 62 Fed. Reg. 6546-01 (proposed Feb. 12, 1997). In response, the National Association of
Social Workers (NASW) proffered as one of its top eight priorities: “[e]xamination of the extent to
which child welfare workers’ fear of both criminal and civil liability charges—given the increasingly
litigious practice environment—inhibit timely and appropriate intervention, and thus, render less than
efficacious treatment.” Nat’l Ass’n Soc. Workers, NASW Comments on Proposed Priorities for
Child Abuse and Neglect Research (1997), http://www.socialworkers.org/archives/advocacy/
updates/1997/ltrchild.htm. It appears that such a study was not funded by NCCAN.
190. See, e.g., Liebmann, supra note 179, at 169–71.
191. See id. at 154–62; see also Guggenheim, supra note 16, at 1742–43.
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Instead, the most convincing portrayals indicate a system rife with both
192
over- and underinclusion.
The horror stories abound, illuminating both types of failure in
193
excruciating detail. That is why it is no answer to object to absolute
immunity on the grounds that child welfare workers have ruined the lives
of too many families with aggressive, unwarranted intrusions. These
unnecessary interventions do not explain away the all-too-numerous
failures to intervene in other cases, where a child’s health or safety is
demonstrably at risk. Because these failures are also numerous, instances
of overintervention cannot be invoked as though they conclusively
demonstrate that absolute immunity for caseworkers is unnecessary or
unwise, as too many caseworkers are already doing too much. In other
words, one can accept, as I do, that too many interventions are
precipitous and damaging, and yet remain unsatisfied that retaining
caseworker liability only for affirmative error is a good way to reduce
these unnecessary interventions.
It is closer to the mark to conclude despairingly that the system fails
so haphazardly—or perhaps predictably—in both directions, and is
subject to so many inputs, that it is perhaps simply unresponsive to
federal immunity doctrines. But in evaluating this possibility as well, we
return to the same question: Is it sound to use this uncertainty about the
actual effect of official liability as a basis to discard our concerns about
DeShaney’s skewed incentives? I would argue, to the contrary, that we
should be unwilling to accept these skewed incentives unless and until we
can conclusively determine that they have no effect on social worker
decisionmaking.
In fact, parity in the legal consequences that attend child welfare
decisionmaking may even be a prerequisite to getting accurate empirical
data about social worker responsiveness to the incentives created by
liability rules. Imagine that a social worker participating in an empirical
study is presented with a fact pattern about a child that appears to be at
risk of harm; the social worker is then asked to state whether or not it
would be appropriate to remove the child from the home in such
circumstances. The study is designed so that this response, perhaps in

192. See Lindsey, supra note 106, at 133–36; Waldfogel, supra note 2, at 84–85; Besharov, supra
note 166, at 48; see also Besharov, supra note 12, at 199–200 (“Social agencies fail to protect children
who need help the most—the victims of physical brutality—by not removing them from their abusive
parents. At the same time, they overreact to cases of social deprivation in poor families.”).
193. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 212–16 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing the
plight of children unjustifiably separated from their loving but battered mothers and placed into the
homes of foster parents who then batter them); Bartholet, supra note 16, at 107 (describing the
testimony of the administrator of a home for abused children, revealing multiple instances of children
sent home to their parents in spite of having received third degree burns, skull fractures, and in the
case of one infant of fifteen months, venereal warts).
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combination with responses to other vignettes or interview questions, is
intended to serve as a sort of baseline against which to measure the
effects of liability concerns on optimal child welfare decisionmaking. But
if the social worker is aware that removing the child may expose her to
personal liability, while leaving the child in the home presents no such
threat, that recognition may skew her response at some level, making it
impossible to develop the necessary baseline.
Unfortunately, after DeShaney, the only way to equalize the
incentives on either side of a removal decision is to equalize down to
nothing, eliminating the prospect of compensation for those individuals
harmed by affirmative social worker conduct. In the next Part, I consider
whether this loss is reason enough to reject absolute immunity as a
means of correcting DeShaney’s skewed incentives.

IV. The Competing Concerns of Compensation
If we do not reliably know that absolute immunity will be an
effective incentive for social workers to act decisively, the argument goes,
then let it not stand in the way of compensation for parents (and
194
children) who suffered unconstitutional infringements of their family
integrity. Putting aside the fact that, on average, social workers get paid
195
less than nurses, public school teachers, police officers, and firefighters,
a potentially serious objection to absolute immunity for caseworkers is
that, regardless of DeShaney’s elimination of relief for Type II error,
federal courts should continue to provide compensation for families
harmed by Type I error. Absolute immunity, after all, insulates
196
deliberate, even malicious violations of constitutional rights not only
from liability, but from the scrutiny of the adversarial process. Even
without absolute immunity, social workers would still be entitled to claim
the defense of qualified immunity, protecting them from reasonable
197
mistakes about what the law requires and providing insulation from
personal liability unless they violated a federal right that was clearly
198
established at the time of the challenged conduct. The Supreme Court

194. The extent to which children’s rights intersect with their parents’ rights has been the source of
much judicial and scholarly comment. Some courts have held that a child’s right to family integrity is
concomitant with that of a parent. See, e.g., Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 923 & n.46
(5th Cir. 2000). Scholars have noted that a parent’s liberty interest in the care, custody, and
management of her child also functions to protect a child’s interest in remaining with her biological
parent. See Huntington, supra note 14, at 644 n.29. The Vermont Supreme Court has articulated the
right in a way that captures this intuition: “the freedom of children and parents to relate to one
another in the context of the family, free of governmental interference . . . .” In re N.H., 373 A.2d 851,
856 (Vt. 1977).
195. See Am. Pub. Human Servs. Ass’n, supra note 159, at 19–20.
196. See Johns, supra note 73, at 55.
197. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001).
198. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638–39 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
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has expansively described qualified immunity as providing “ample
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
199
violate the law.”
We have to ask: Why is qualified immunity not the better balance
between the need to protect social worker decisionmaking and the goal
of compensating individuals harmed by unjustified intrusions on their
family’s privacy? In this context, the fairest inquiry is not to compare the
harsh results of absolute immunity with the results of qualified immunity,
by which the latter seems to be the more moderate and balanced
approach, but to compare qualified immunity with DeShaney’s absolute
ban on liability for social workers whose transgression is a failure to act.
In this very specific context, how could qualified immunity, with its
intractable indeterminacy, be enough to counteract the very clear
200
application of DeShaney’s rule?
A. Qualified Immunity Is Indeterminate
That qualified immunity is indeterminate has been amply
201
demonstrated by a number of legal scholars. But for present purposes,
there is perhaps no better illustration than that which appears in a
periodical published for social workers. In an article explaining the
difference between absolute and qualified immunity, and indicating in
which jurisdictions each immunity defense may be used, the journal
Social Work cautions its readers,
[S]ocial workers . . . should be aware that their actions will be
scrutinized before the courts will rule that they have qualified
immunity. . . . [S]ocial workers must present more than just mere
testimony that they thought the actions taken were right or that their
professional training required the actions taken. They must convince a
judge that their conduct did not violate clearly established rights that a
202
reasonable person would have known.

800, 818 (1982). The Supreme Court has described qualified immunity as a “fair warning” standard.
See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). As articulated by one lower court, “[public] [o]fficials are
not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.” Maciariello v.
Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992).
199. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
200. That DeShaney’s rule is clear in application, at least in relation to other doctrines we might
identify, is borne out by an examination of the cases in which it has been held to govern. See supra
note 41.
201. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 150, at 263 (“[T]he Supreme Court has crafted this qualified
immunity standard into a broad set of general guidelines that require lower courts to analyze
immunity claims on a case-by-case basis.”).
202. Rudolph Alexander, Jr., Social Workers and Immunity from Civil Lawsuits, 40 Social Work
648, 653 (1995). The National Association of Social Workers, the organization that publishes the
journal, describes the journal as follows:
Social Work is the premiere journal of the social work profession. Widely read by
practitioners, faculty, and students, it is the official journal of NASW and is provided to all
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This is, all told, a pretty accurate description of qualified
203
immunity. Qualified immunity is highly fact-dependent, requiring the
204
and
introduction of often voluminous amounts of evidence
205
correspondingly lengthy pretrial and discovery proceedings. Not only
does the specter of prolonged scrutiny loom large, but social workers are
correctly advised that their actions will not withstand scrutiny merely on
206
the basis of good faith or professional judgment. Consequently, this
brief description of qualified immunity, targeted towards social workers
seeking to understand a conceptually difficult form of protection from
liability, is not particularly reassuring.
The rejoinder, of course, is that we do not want qualified immunity
to be overly reassuring; indeed, one of the goals of official liability, even
207
in its qualified form, is to deter unconstitutional conduct. But this is

members as a membership benefit. Social Work is dedicated to improving practice and
advancing knowledge in social work and social welfare. Its articles yield new insights into
established practices, evaluate new techniques and research, examine current social
problems, and bring serious critical analysis to bear on problems in the profession. Major
emphasis is placed on social policy and the solutions to serious human problems.
Social Work, NASW Press, http://www.naswpress.org/publications/journals/sw.html (last visited Dec.
17, 2010).
203. The language of this excerpt suggests that the social worker defendant has the burden of
establishing an entitlement to qualified immunity. It is quite right that qualified immunity is an
affirmative defense and thus, the defendant has the burden of raising it; however, the circuits disagree
as to which party has the ultimate burden of proof. The majority of circuits hold that once the
defendant has raised the qualified immunity defense, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the defendant violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time
of the alleged conduct. See Martin A. Schwartz & Kathryn R. Urbonya, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Section
1983 Litigation 151 (2d ed. 2008). The Second Circuit, however, requires the defendant to bear the
burden of both pleading and proving an entitlement to qualified immunity. See Lee v. Sandberg,
136 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 1997).
204. See Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 Emory L.J. 229, 230 (2006)
(“[R]easonableness analyses inherently entail nuanced, fact-sensitive, case-by-case determinations
involving the application of general legal principles to a particular context. The fact-intensive nature of
these inquiries is exacerbated by the predominance of multifactored balancing tests in substantive
constitutional law.”). Chen posits that the doctrine has become “not only internally inconsistent, but
also extraordinarily difficult and costly to administer.” Id. at 230–31.
205. In Mitchell v. Forsyth, for example, pretrial proceedings and discovery lasted five and a half
years. 472 U.S. 511, 515 (1985).
206. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816–18 (1982). Qualified immunity previously included
both a subjective and an objective component; the Court abandoned the subjective good faith inquiry,
because it made the doctrine too difficult to adjudicate at early stages of litigation. See id. While
professional judgment is an element of some substantive constitutional inquiries, it is not a predicate
for qualified immunity. Id.
207. Chen, supra note 150, at 263 (“Damages serve the complementary objectives of compensating
the constitutional tort victim and of deterring not only the specific defendants but also other public
officials from committing similar constitutional infractions in the future.”); James J. Park, The
Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 393, 400 (2003)
(“Theoretically, constitutional tort actions should deter constitutional violations by raising their cost.
If government officials commit constitutional torts, they will be subject to suits and forced to pay
damage awards. By making conduct that violates the Constitution more costly, damage awards should
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what makes qualified immunity a poor counterweight against DeShaney’s
208
markedly skewed incentives. DeShaney completely eliminates liability
for all failures to intervene; it functions as a one-sided absolute
immunity, providing total insulation for inaction. Qualified immunity, on
the other hand, at least theoretically retains enough of a threat to deter
some subset of removals.
B. Compensation for Parents Bringing Suit Under a Qualified
Immunity Regime Is Nonetheless Extremely Difficult to Achieve
We might begrudgingly accept this uneven state of affairs—an
absolute ban on omission-liability paired with a qualified defense to actliability—in the name of providing some compensation to those harmed
by affirmative conduct from overzealous caseworkers. Qualified

increase the incentive of government officials to avoid such conduct. As a result, fewer individuals
should be subject to constitutional rights deprivations.”); see also Thomas E. O’Brien, The Paradox of
Qualified Immunity: How a Mechanical Application of the Objective Legal Reasonableness Test Can
Undermine the Goal of Qualified Immunity, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 767, 767 (2004) (asserting that damage
suits against government officials deter unlawful conduct). But see Daryl J. Levinson, Making
Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345,
347 (2000) (arguing that the deterrence effects of constitutional tort actions are limited).
208. This same sort of indeterminacy is what makes insurance and indemnification policies
inadequate responses to the incentive problem. Although these arrangements vary widely from state
to state, they typically contain exclusions for actions committed in bad faith, variously phrased as
“actual fraud, corruption, or malice”; “willful or wanton acts or omissions”; “willful misconduct”;
“malice or criminal intent”; “malicious or fraudulent acts”; “gross negligence, fraud or malice” and so
on. See Schuck, supra note 163, at 87 (internal quotation marks omitted). As Schuck argues:
These exclusions, of course, are a source of great uncertainty for officials who face litigation,
as they create potentially large lacunae in indemnification schemes. If denial of
indemnification could be surgically limited to truly malicious officials held liable under
§ 1983 (or under state law), wrongdoing could be deterred with little or no cost to vigorous
decisionmaking. But where bad faith is not restricted to actual malice but can be based upon
other factors about which officials may bear the burden of proof under a decidedly
amorphous judicial standard, the threat to vigorous decisionmaking may be great.
Id.; see also Gilles, supra note 162, at 30–31 (“[I]ndemnification provisions are themselves wrought
with uncertainty and difficulties. . . . [I]ndemnification statutes invariably afford the municipality the
unilateral option of disclaiming coverage in broad categories of cases.”). For a rather counterintuitive
take on the incomplete nature of indemnification, see K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846,
850 (7th Cir. 1990). Judge Posner begins by arguing that the familiar justification for official immunity
becomes strained when a “governmental entity indemnifies its employees for damages and other
expenses that they incur in defending against suits that complain about their performance of official
duties.” Id. He recognizes that “[t]he indemnity is not always complete, and some governmental
entities provide no indemnity, the federal government being a prominent example.” Id. Judge Posner
then suggests:
[I]f the public employer itself, by refusing to indemnify its employees for torts committed
in the course of public employment—or the legislature, by refusing to authorize indemnity,
out of concern with the public fisc—manifests indifference to the disincentive effects of tort
liability, it may be questioned whether the courts should worry about those effects and seek
to offset them.
Id.
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immunity, however, is becoming an increasingly difficult hurdle for
plaintiffs to overcome. The Court has made it clear that it views qualified
immunity not merely as immunity from damages, but as an immunity
209
from suit, and the Justices have continually reworked and adjusted the
doctrine to satisfy that objective. An important example is the
210
availability of interlocutory appeal from denials of qualified immunity,
211
a procedural innovation that keeps § 1983 plaintiffs away from juries.
Added to this are decisions that occupy the nether region between
procedural and substantive; recall that for a plaintiff to overcome
qualified immunity, the constitutional right she is asserting must have
212
been clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. In
elaborating on this requirement, the Supreme Court has cautioned that
the right in question must have been established in a fairly particularized
sense:
[T]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This
is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity
unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful,
but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness
213
must be apparent.

While the Court rejected a circuit court’s requirement that the facts of
214
existing precedent be “materially similar,” it has demanded close
factual correspondence between the preexisting law invoked by a
215
plaintiff and the facts of her own case.
Thus, the first challenge for a parent who seeks damages against a
social worker is the same as that of any § 1983 plaintiff: She might be the
first to show up in court with her particular type of constitutional
216
challenge. In fact, even if other plaintiffs have previously asserted such
a claim, she may not be able to point to clearly established law; if courts

209. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
210. Id. at 527; see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306 (1996); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S.
304, 313 (1995) (recognizing Mitchell as establishing that interlocutory appeal is appropriate where the
question to be decided is legal, not factual).
211. See Mark R. Brown, The Rise and Fall of Qualified Immunity: From Hope to Harris, 9 Nev.
L.J. 185, 194–96 (2008); Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and
the Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 21–22 (1997); Allen H. Denson,
Comment, Neither Clear nor Established: The Problem with Objective Legal Reasonableness, 59 Ala.
L. Rev. 747, 762 (2008).
212. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
213. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (citation omitted).
214. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002).
215. See id. at 739–41.
216. See, e.g., Kiser v. Garrett, 67 F.3d 1166, 1174 (5th Cir. 1995) (reasoning that where plaintiff’s
father asserted that his due process rights were violated by the social workers’ failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence, even if that right existed, it was not clearly established at the time of the state
court custody proceedings).
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faced with that constitutional claim have previously declined to elucidate
217
the contours of a right, it may well remain insufficiently established for
her to overcome qualified immunity. At best, she may obtain a ruling
218
vindicating her assertion that her constitutional rights were violated,
but she will not receive damages from the individual official who caused
219
the constitutional deprivation.
Parents seeking damages for claims arising from child protection
proceedings face an even steeper climb, arising out of the particular
constitutional right they seek to vindicate. Unless they can successfully
assert that their child was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s
220
reasonableness requirement, or that the removal of their child was not
221
accompanied by constitutionally adequate procedural safeguards,
parents will, by and large, rely on substantive due process, arguing that
the state’s intervention violated their fundamental liberty interest in the
222
care and custody of their children. The Supreme Court first identified
such a right more than eighty years ago, along with the corresponding
acknowledgment that states nonetheless retain a great deal of authority
under their police power to regulate the physical, mental, and moral

217. To address concerns that the law would never develop if courts could repeatedly refuse to
state whether a certain type of conduct was unconstitutional, the Supreme Court suggested and then
required that lower courts first decide whether the plaintiff had suffered a constitutional violation
while assessing a defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity. See Sam Kamin, An Article III
Defense of Merits-First Decisionmaking in Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued Viability of Saucier v.
Katz, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 53, 53–54 (2008). Only if the defendant’s conduct was determined to be
unconstitutional would the court then proceed to inquire whether that was clearly established at the
time of the challenged conduct. Id. The “order-of-decisionmaking” rule was widely criticized, see id. at
54, and the Court recently abandoned it in Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009).
218. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2644 (2009) (“The strip
search of Savana Redding was . . . [unconstitutional], but petitioners . . . are nevertheless protected
from liability through qualified immunity.”).
219. Only under very limited circumstances might she obtain damages from the entity that
employs the officer. States enjoy sovereign immunity from suits brought pursuant to § 1983. While
qualified immunity protects only individual officials and not entities, there is no respondeat superior
liability under § 1983; an agency or municipality thus can only be liable for damages if the
constitutional violation occurred pursuant to official policy or custom. See Aviel, supra note 52, at 222–
24.
220. The Third and Ninth Circuits have held that a social worker must satisfy the warrant and
probable cause requirements to conduct a strip search of a child. See Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808,
817–18 (9th Cir. 1999); Good v. Dauphin Cnty. Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1092
(3d Cir. 1989); see also Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299 F.3d 395, 407–08 (5th
Cir. 2002) (stating that a social worker needs a warrant, the parent must give permission, or there must
exist exigent circumstances to subject a child to a visual body cavity search); Tenenbaum v. Williams,
193 F.3d 581, 604–05 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that social workers must obtain judicial approval to have
physician perform gynecological exam on child without parental permission).
221. See, e.g., Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 828 (2d Cir. 1977); cf. Croft v. Westmoreland
Cnty. Children & Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1126 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that a procedural due
process issue was raised by an agency’s policy of removing a suspected parent from the family home,
without any procedural safeguards, while child abuse investigations were pending).
222. See, e.g., Abdouch v. Burger, 426 F.3d 982, 987–88 (8th Cir. 2005).
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223

well-being of their citizens. But it continually revisited the fraught
relationship between a parent’s liberty interest and the State’s parens
patriae authority in contexts that did little to illustrate the contours of the
constitutional right, resolving disputes over parents’ asserted prerogative
to have their children learn a foreign language before the age of
224
225
fourteen, attend private school, accompany a parent engaged in
226
religious proselytizing, or withdraw from school after eighth grade to
227
participate in the Amish community. In deciding these rather factspecific cases, the Court continually reiterated the abstract principle that
parents enjoy a fundamental right that is limited by the state’s parens
patriae obligation, but provided no analytical framework for how these
interests should be balanced against each other when they were shown to
be in conflict.
Although later cases gave rise to more workable principles with
broader application, such as the notion that a state cannot terminate
228
parental rights absent a showing of parental unfitness, these precedents
still could be seen as falling short of providing the sort of “close factual
correspondence” that would allow damages to be awarded to parents,
who, for example, had their children returned to them following a
prolonged and assertedly unjustified separation. If the Constitution
forbids the state from terminating parental rights absent a showing of
parental unfitness, what does it say to the State about the suspension of
these rights when a child is temporarily placed in State custody over the
objection of her parents? What sort of showing does that require? Does
the State’s demonstrative burden increase along with the length of
separation?
Rather than attempting to venture some answers and await
correction or confirmation from the Supreme Court, in a process that
would eventually build a “clearly established” law of constitutional
obligations in the child welfare context, many of the lower courts have
concluded that the competing interests that need to be balanced against
each other vitiate not only the existence but also the possibility of clear
229
principles in this area. These opinions have suggested that the right to

223. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
224. Id. at 397.
225. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530 (1925).
226. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159–60 (1944).
227. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
228. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651–52 (1972) (reinforcing the idea, under the rubric of
procedural due process and equal protection, that a parent’s liberty interest is limited by the state’s
interest in child welfare, and suggesting that the State may not interpose itself simply because it has a
different idea of what is best for the child, but rather must justify its intervention by a showing of
harm).
229. See Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1023 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Tenenbaum v.
Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 596 (2d Cir. 1999); Kiser v. Garrett, 67 F.3d 1166, 1169–74 (5th Cir. 1995); Doe
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family integrity is inherently nebulous, such that any alleged
constitutional violation stemming from a child’s removal “will rarely—if
230
ever—be clearly established.” In gearing up for such a conclusion, a
court begins by noting that a parent’s liberty interest in the care and
custody of her children is limited by the state’s “potentially conflicting,
231
compelling interest in the safety and welfare of the children.” The court
then observes that it must “weigh the interests of the state and child
against those of the parents to determine whether a constitutional
232
violation has occurred.” The disabling conclusion for the parent is the
notion that “[t]he need to continually subject the assertion of this
abstract substantive due process right to a balancing test . . . makes the
233
qualified immunity defense difficult to overcome.”
It is rather remarkable to witness federal courts repeatedly
suggesting that as a matter of law, a constitutional right is beyond
workable articulation—that not only was it not clearly established at the
time of the alleged violation, but it never will be. This deserves its own
234
entry in the “right without remedy” pantheon. At least one court has
made explicit the logical conclusion: If the courts cannot articulate what
the Constitution requires in these circumstances, then it will, as a matter
of course, be “difficult, if not impossible, for officials” to know what they
235
must do to comply. The underlying premise, that not only will the law
never be clear enough to justify damages, but that violations of this very
theoretical right are inevitable, is troubling. In short, in the unanswered
questions left by the Supreme Court’s parental rights jurisprudence,
lower courts have found a license to declare the right intrinsically
236
unknowable and therefore unredressable through damages actions.
Thus, qualified immunity looks capacious next to absolute
immunity, especially from the social worker’s perspective, but it offers
very slim prospects for recovery in the child welfare context, producing
exactly that dynamic Schuck described twenty years ago: “[T]he
subjectively perceived risks of litigation loom far greater than the

v. Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1412, 1417–18 (5th Cir. 1993); Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 929–31 (1st Cir.
1992); Hodorowski v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210, 1216–17 (5th Cir. 1988)).
230. Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1023.
231. Abdouch v. Burger, 426 F.3d 982, 987 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Manzano v. S.D. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 60 F.3d 505, 510 (8th Cir. 1995)).
232. Id.
233. Id. (quoting Manzano, 60 F.3d at 510) (internal quotation marks omitted).
234. See Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (2002)
(reviewing doctrines that drive a wedge between a violation of rights and a remedy for the violation).
235. Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 931 (1st Cir. 1992).
236. The Second Circuit has made an effort to articulate constitutional standards in this context.
See Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir. 1999) (relying on an objective reasonableness
standard).
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objective probability of liability alone would suggest.”
The
indeterminacy of qualified immunity makes it burdensome to litigate and
leaves open the possibility, however remote, of damages. For this reason,
qualified immunity fails to assuage whatever fear of liability might be
motivating social workers to inaction, while at the same time failing to
provide compensation to the vast majority of families wronged. This is
the worst of possible worlds, generating the overdeterrence that has
238
worried courts and scholars about constitutional tort liability, without
239
the compensation that is supposedly its primary objective. Against this
very low bar, absolute immunity starts to look a little better, for all of its
troubling aspects.
C. While Absolute Immunity Would Eliminate Compensation for a
Subset of Plaintiffs Who Could Overcome Qualified Immunity,
DESHANEY Requires This Painful Choice
To this point, I have argued that our concern that absolute
immunity eliminates compensation for victims of constitutional torts is
more powerful in the abstract than when evaluated against the actual
prospects of recovery under a qualified immunity scheme. But there are
families who would be able to recover damages for violations of their
240
constitutional rights under a qualified immunity scheme. Even if we
were to focus on this narrow swath of families for whom absolute
immunity eliminates recovery that would otherwise be available,
absolute immunity remains the necessary but painful choice.
To see why, it is useful to break down the various categories of
individuals who have rights against the State when it comes to social
worker intrusion into the family. There are abused children and their
241
parents, and there are non-abused children and their parents. The
constitutional rights that might form the basis of a § 1983 claim against a
social worker, limited as they are to negative liberties against state
interference, are not of equal value or force to these different categories
242
of rights-holders. Children in abusive homes benefit very little from

237. Schuck, supra note 163, at 80–81.
238. See supra note 162.
239. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988).
240. See, e.g., Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 923–24 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that one of the
defendants could be liable because the relevant law was clearly established).
241. The reader will quickly see that for this Part, I do not engage two enormously difficult
questions: (1) where the line is drawn, and (2) how the social worker is supposed to know which
families are on which side of the line. I simply assume that families fall into one category or the other,
so as to illustrate that (1) constitutional rights operate differently on either side of the line, and (2)
what happens on one side of the line may affect what happens on the other side of the line in harmful
and unintended ways.
242. “Rights, constitutional and otherwise, do not exist in a vacuum. Their purpose is to protect
persons from injuries to particular interests, and their contours are shaped by the interests they
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their negative liberties. A brutalized four-year-old’s right to be left
alone is a meager right indeed. It is worse than meager; it is meaningless,
244
even cruel.
Negative liberties are worth more to their parents, of course; indeed,
an important body of scholarship criticizes our scheme of negative
liberties on the grounds that such a regime insulates private hierarchies
and empowers the strong to subordinate the weak within these private
245
spheres. On the other hand, most abusive parents are desperately poor
and themselves would benefit from affirmative state assistance rather
246
than from the presumption of privacy that negative liberties provide.
In any event, putting aside the somewhat difficult question of
whether abusive parents benefit or suffer from the insulating effect of
247
negative liberties, as a doctrinal matter, abusive parents forfeit their
negative liberties against state intervention upon harming their child. As
discussed above, the liberty interest in familial integrity is limited by the
compelling governmental interest in the protection of children,
particularly where the children need to be protected from their own

protect.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978).
243. The Supreme Court has instructed that “the abstract value of a constitutional right may not
form the basis for § 1983 damages.” Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986).
244. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse
74–75 (1991) (“By exalting autonomy to the degree we do, we systematically slight the very young, the
severely ill or disabled, the frail elderly, as well as those who care for them—and impair their own
ability to be free and independent in so doing. . . . The exceptional solitariness of the American rightsbearer is but one aspect of the hyperindividualism that pervades our American right dialect.”).
245. See West, Rights, supra note 62, at xv; see also Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the
Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment,
47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 413, 421 (2005) (“Enabled and then protected by liberalism’s doctrine of
parental autonomy, adults sometimes cause great harm to their children.”); Judith G. McMullen,
Privacy, Family Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75 Marq. L. Rev. 569, 569 (1992) (“Attempts to
accommodate family autonomy and privacy interests have significantly compromised the protection of
our children . . . .”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Children’s Rights: The Destruction and Promise of
Family, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 497, 511 (“As women and children know best, family privacy can be
oppressive as well as protective.”).
246. See Garrison, supra note 17, at 1790–91 (“[C]hildren served by the child welfare
system . . . typically live in extreme poverty, in inadequate housing, with inadequate social and
community supports. Most parents show massive disability in their functioning, and many are mentally
ill, alcoholic, or addicted to drugs. Frequently, they or their children have chronic physical illnesses.
They are seldom employed and poorly educated. Multiple stresses and severe deprivation overwhelm
these families, with the result that many parents become unable to cope with their children.”
(footnotes omitted)).
247. See James G. Dwyer, Children’s Interests in a Family Context—A Cautionary Note, 39 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 1053, 1071–72 (1999) (“[P]arents do not benefit from being able to abuse their
children. . . . [W]here parents’ impulses toward abusive conduct are destroying their relationship with
their children, the parents themselves would benefit from intervention that can help them get on a
different track, a track that leads to a mutually rewarding relationship with their offspring. It is
therefore a mistake, I think, to view state intervention in abuse situations as always ‘for’ the child and
‘against’ the parent. Parents share with children an interest in receiving appropriate state
intervention.”).

Aviel_62-HLJ-401.doc (Do Not Delete)

448

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1/7/2011 12:16 PM

[Vol. 62:401

248

parents. While a parent’s liberty interest in the care of her children
does not “evaporate” simply because she has not been a “model
249
parent,” no court would hold that a truly abusive parent whose child is
removed from her custody has suffered an unconstitutional intrusion on
the right to family integrity. However unsure we might be about the
parameters of the right, we know that it simply does not include the right
to abuse one’s children without state intervention. In short, it is not for
these families that we need to maintain compensatory damages; the
State’s intervention does not give rise to a constitutional cause of action
in these scenarios.
On the other hand, children in non-abusive homes do benefit
enormously from their negative liberties, as do their parents. Negative
liberties keep the state from separating these families without cause. As
some family preservationists have reminded us so passionately, an
unwarranted intrusion is not merely a violation of the parents’ rights
against the state, it is a serious threat to the child’s well-being and a
250
predicate for potentially devastating harms. Negative liberties block
the meddlesome State from intruding on family integrity, a right that is
truly precious in those families for whom there is insufficient cause to
intervene. Absolute immunity would prevent these children and their
parents from seeking damages for their wrongful separation, and that is a
cost that cannot be taken lightly, however unlikely it might be that these
families could surmount the defense of qualified immunity and actually
receive a judgment entitling them to compensation from the offending
social worker.
The problem, as illustrated by the vignette at the very beginning of
this Article, is that it is not always easy to tell which families fall into
which category; in fact, it can be extraordinarily difficult. And if
immunity doctrines work in the way the courts and many scholars have
251
assumed, then the availability of damages for non-abused children who
were wrongfully removed will chill social worker conduct with regards to
abused children who should be removed. The latter group suffers from
the fact that after DeShaney, social workers face no federal liability for
failing to act. Since liability attaches only to affirmative conduct, social
workers might reflect unduly on the damages available to non-abused
children, erroneously removed from their homes, before making a
decision to remove an abused child.

248. See Abdouch v. Burger, 426 F.3d 982, 987 (8th Cir. 2005).
249. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
250. See, e.g., Martin Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights 192–96 (2005)
(“Children do not thrive in foster care. The state is a poor substitute for one’s family.”).
251. See supra note 162.
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The question then becomes whether abused children have a greater
claim to protective removal than non-abused children and their parents
have to compensatory damages. I argue that the unfortunate answer is
yes, and this is the essence of my contention: Absolute immunity shields
the abused child’s claim to protective removal from what might
otherwise be the effect of DeShaney’s regrettable calculus. If this sounds
252
like the sort of “freewheeling policy choice” that the Supreme Court
has professed to eschew in its immunity jurisprudence, well, perhaps it
253
is. But in DeShaney’s long shadow, what a painfully unremarkable,
unambitious policy choice it turns out to be: simply, that a social worker
should face equal incentives on both sides of a removal decision.

V. Delineating the Parameters
Once the choice for absolute immunity is made, it is critical to
circumscribe its parameters. As discussed in preceding Parts, Butz v.
Economou, the one case in which the Supreme Court has explicitly
extended absolute immunity to officials based on function rather than
job title, has done little to illuminate for the lower courts any viable
method for assessing whether a particular type of public official engages
254
in conduct that is functionally analogous to that of a prosecutor. But it
does provide some guidance as to the aspects of a social worker’s role for
which absolute immunity might be appropriate. The Court placed a great
deal of emphasis on the procedural safeguards in administrative
adjudications that enhance reliable decisionmaking and protect
constitutional rights in the first instance, reducing the need for private
damages actions after the fact as a means of “controlling unconstitutional
255
These safeguards—opportunities to present evidence,
conduct.”
adversarial testing, adjudication by a neutral decisionmaker, and
appellate review—are essential predicates to an absolute immunity
256
scheme that maintains a minimal commitment to constitutional rights.
If there is any sort of limiting principle to be found in the Court’s
pronouncement that absolute immunity covers only that conduct
“intimately associated” with judicial proceedings, it inheres in the

252. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986).
253. See Chen, supra note 150, at 271 n.50 (reviewing scholarly work that characterizes the Court’s
immunity jurisprudence as “unabashedly policy-based”).
254. See supra Part II.B.
255. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978).
256. See Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing”, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1279–95 (1975).
Judge Friendly proposed the following as elements of a fair hearing: an unbiased tribunal; notice of the
proposed action and the grounds asserted for it; an opportunity to present reasons why the proposed
action should not be taken; the right to call witnesses; the right to know the evidence against one; a
decision based only on the evidence presented; an opportunity for representation by counsel; the
making of a record and a statement of reasons; public attendance; and judicial review. See id.
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presence of these safeguards, which both describe, as a doctrinal matter,
when absolute immunity attaches, and justify, as a normative matter,
absolute immunity’s affront to the principle that every violation of a legal
257
right must have a remedy.
In the child welfare context, then, absolute immunity would attach
upon a social worker’s formal initiation of dependency proceedings, in
accordance with the procedures specified by state law. The immunity
should include presenting evidence to support the petition, making
recommendations to the court, and executing orders obtained as a result
of the filing of the petition—including, most notably, a court’s order to
remove a child from her parent’s home. The investigative conduct that
precedes a social worker’s decision to initiate judicial proceedings should
remain outside the scope of absolute immunity. These investigations
258
are largely
present the threat of serious invasions of privacy,
259
unsupervised by the courts, and do not trigger a right to counsel. For
the same reasons, absolute immunity should not attach to warrantless
emergency removals, or to those authorized following an ex parte
260
As these emergency removals have been criticized as
hearing.

257. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“[I]t is a general and indisputable
rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever
that right is invaded.” (quoting 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *23)). The rights-remedies gap
in constitutional law is so pervasive, and has been so well documented, that Justice Marshall’s famous
pronouncement can hardly be invoked without a bit of irony. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries Jr., The RightRemedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L.J. 87, 87 (1999) (“Ever since John Marshall insisted
that for every violation of a right, there must be a remedy, American constitutionalists have decried
the right-remedy gap in constitutional law.”). That said, some doctrines offend this principle more
nakedly than others, absolute immunity being chief among them.
258. Coleman, supra note 245, at 436–41.
259. Buss, supra note 116, at 433–34. (“Investigations of abuse and neglect reports are routinely
done by case workers with little or no specialized training in how to approach the families, how to
conduct an effective and appropriate investigation, and how to assess the information uncovered.
These investigations are inherently coercive because parents know that whether or not they can keep
their children hangs in the balance. Cooperation is therefore at a premium. In this context, it is not
surprising that parents who under most circumstances would never consent to a strip search of their
children by a stranger, would give their consent to an abuse investigator, for fear that failure to agree
would translate into an admission that they had something to hide. Parents are forced to respond to
these coercive investigations without the assistance of lawyers or the supervision of judges.”).
260. This stays true to the Supreme Court’s own parsing of the difference between a police officer
applying for a warrant and a prosecutor seeking an indictment. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
342–43 (1986); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 128 (1997). After the Court announced in
Imbler v. Pachtman that prosecutors have absolute immunity for functions intimately associated with
the judicial process, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976), a police officer who had been sued for obtaining a search
warrant that was allegedly unsupported by probable cause argued that this was conduct intimately
associated with the judicial process and thus, covered by absolute immunity under Imbler’s rationale.
See Malley, 475 U.S. at 341–42. The Supreme Court rejected the analogy on the grounds that applying
for a search warrant is too far removed from the actual criminal prosecution to be covered by
prosecutorial immunity:
We intend no disrespect to the officer applying for a warrant by observing that his action,
while a vital part of the administration of criminal justice, is further removed from the
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particularly prone to error, traumatic for children, and difficult to reverse
in subsequent stages of the child protection process, we might be
interested in encouraging social workers to forego these emergency
261
removals in the majority of cases. Similarly, we might welcome
incentives for social workers to reduce reliance on informal “voluntary”
arrangements that operate in coercive ways and remain outside the scope
262
of judicial scrutiny and its attendant safeguards.
A shrewd observer might note that a social worker would thus have
an incentive to hurry to the courthouse, cutting short an investigation for
which she is protected only by qualified immunity and rushing to file a
263
petition that brings her the full protection of absolute immunity. But
this contains its own check: At least in theory, a petition that is
unsupported by sufficient evidence will be vulnerable to serious
challenge by a parent’s attorney, or the child’s guardian ad litem, and
subject to dismissal by the dependency court judge. That is why it
matters that absolute immunity would insulate only the forms of social
worker conduct that are judicially supervised and reflect indicia of the
264
adversarial process.
Also exempted from absolute immunity should be any and all
failures by the State to protect the welfare of children in the State’s foster
265
care system. Both the Fourth and the Seventh Circuits provide
examples of this approach, extending absolute immunity to social
266
workers for the decision to initiate child dependency proceedings but
applying qualified immunity to claims against social workers arising from
267
harms suffered by children while in foster care. While the Fourth

judicial phase of criminal proceedings than the act of a prosecutor in seeking an indictment.
Furthermore, petitioner’s analogy, while it has some force, does not take account of the fact
that the prosecutor’s act in seeking an indictment is but the first step in the process of
seeking a conviction. Exposing the prosecutor to liability for the initial phase of his
prosecutorial work could interfere with his exercise of independent judgment at every phase
of his work, since the prosecutor might come to see later decisions in terms of their effect on
his potential liability. Thus, we shield the prosecutor seeking an indictment because any
lesser immunity could impair the performance of a central actor in the judicial process.
Id. at 342–43.
261. See Chill, supra note 16, at 541.
262. See Katherine C. Pearson, Cooperate or We’ll Take Your Child: The Parents’ Fictional
Voluntary Separation Decision and a Proposal for Change, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 835, 836 (1998).
263. Thanks are due to Alan Chen for this observation.
264. What’s trickier is what happens when social workers present fabricated evidence. The Ninth
Circuit has recently narrowed the scope of social worker immunity to eliminate this type of conduct
from absolute protection. See Beltran v. Santa Clara Cnty., 514 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
265. The problem of children being abused and neglected while in foster care is grave, growing,
and well documented. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 14, at 662.
266. See Millspaugh v. Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 937 F.2d 1172, 1176 (7th Cir. 1991); Vosburg v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 884 F.2d 133, 137–38 (4th Cir. 1989).
267. See White ex rel. White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731 736–37 (4th Cir. 1997); K.H. ex rel. Murphy
v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 854 (7th Cir. 1990).
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Circuit has done so without explaining this distinction, the Seventh
Circuit has provided some insight, noting that state courts rarely, if ever,
delineate the particular foster care home or institution into which a child
268
should be placed. The inspection and licensing of foster homes, the
initial placement of a child in a particular home, the transfer of a child
from one foster home to another, and all too often, to many more, all
take place outside the purview of judicially supervised, adversarial
269
proceedings with the safeguards extolled in Butz. A social worker’s
management of a child’s foster care placements is administrative conduct
that is too far removed from the judicial process to be covered by
270
absolute immunity.
This proposed framework has two serious shortcomings. First, it
rests on assumptions that are only as strong as judicial review itself.
Absolute immunity is a judicially created doctrine and reflects a deep
trust in the adversary process conducted under judicial supervision; it
requires an abiding faith in the procedural safeguards that attend judicial
proceedings. It has been amply demonstrated that this faith is not always
justified; dependency court, in particular, has been described as a
“grossly overburdened and underfunded system that resides at the
271
bottom of the judicial hierarchy.” A Third Circuit case, for example,
reveals that five years of judicial supervision by the Chester County
Court of Common Pleas were insufficient to alert the court to the fact
that social workers recommended against family reunification out of
personal animosity, rather than on the basis of professional concerns for
272
the well-being of the child. Judges, like social workers, err grievously in
the other direction as well, granting inexplicably unfounded requests to
discharge dependency petitions that are supported by overwhelming
273
The trust placed in judicial review is obviously and
evidence.
inescapably aspirational, but it is an aspiration of almost unparalleled
importance in our constitutional system. It is the essence of due process;
it is consistent with our constitutional values and traditions that absolute
immunity for social workers, as well as other officials, be limited to
proceedings that are conducted under judicial review.
The more serious shortcoming, in my view, is that this parsing of the
various stages of a social worker’s professional involvement with a child

268. K.H., 914 F.2d at 868 (Coffey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
269. Cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978).
270. See supra Part II.
271. Kathleen S. Bean, Changing the Rules: Public Access to Dependency Court, 79 Denv. U. L.
Rev. 1, 50 (2001).
272. See Ernst v. Child & Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 489–90, 504 (3d Cir. 1997).
273. See S.S. ex rel. Jervis v. McMullen, 225 F.3d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal even
though plaintiff alleged defendants knew that her father allowed her to have contact with a known
pedophile).
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comes at some cost to clarity, as has been embarrassingly evident with
274
prosecutorial immunity. The more complicated a regime, the more
uncertainty it produces with respect to the types of conduct that
engender each level of protection, and the less likely it is to achieve its
objectives. If child welfare workers do not understand which of their
functions are absolutely protected and which might require them to
“convince a judge that their conduct did not violate clearly established
275
rights that a reasonable person would have known,” the absolute
immunity they receive for some of their conduct will serve only as a
barrier to relief, rather than as an instrument for vigorous
276
decisionmaking.
As awkward as prosecutorial immunity has become, however, the
Court retains it because it is so committed to the position that
prosecutors require freedom from liability to exercise fully their
independent judgment about who and when to prosecute and how to
277
present a case in court. And the Court retains the functional analysis, in
spite of the confusion it has generated, to avoid overbreadth—to allow
damages suits to proceed against prosecutors for conduct that does not
278
directly implicate these concerns. This same tension is in play for social
workers who are making a decision about whether to initiate child
dependency proceedings, with the added dynamic that, unlike
prosecutors, who represent the public at large, social workers are tasked
with protecting specific identified children, known to the State to be
vulnerable, at risk of harm, and in need of care.
For all its complexity, the absolute immunity doctrine allows courts
279
to resolve most claims that fall within its scope on the pleadings. To the
extent that qualified immunity lacks the modicum of clarity provided by

274. Prosecutorial conduct covered by absolute immunity includes initiating criminal proceedings,
knowingly introducing false testimony, and suppressing exculpatory evidence. See supra Part II.A.
Actions taken by prosecutors that have not been categorized under the prosecutorial mantle, and
which are subject to a qualified rather than absolute immunity defense, include shopping for an expert
witness who would give the desired opinion regarding some forensic evidence, giving a press
conference announcing that there was evidence tying the defendant to the murder, and fabricating
evidence as part of the pre-prosecution investigation. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 262
(1993). Perhaps the hallmark of absurdity is Burns v. Reed, in which the Supreme Court determined
that a prosecutor was entitled only to qualified immunity after advising a police officer that a suspect
could be hypnotized but was entitled to absolute immunity for introducing into evidence at trial the
confession produced by the selfsame hypnosis. 500 U.S. 478, 492, 496 (1991).
275. See supra note 202.
276. See Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 Duke L.J.
1, 45 (1992) (“Call it the ‘audience principle.’ It holds that the complexity of a rule should be tailored
to the sophistication and cost-bearing capacities of those who will have to interpret and implement it.”
(citing Boris I. Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 5 (1974))).
277. See supra Part II.A.
278. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126 (1997).
279. See Chen, supra note 204, at 234–35.
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absolute immunity, without the corresponding prospect of actual
280
recovery for parent victims of unconstitutional conduct, it is worse.

Conclusion
In arguing that social workers should be entitled to absolute
immunity for their decisions to seek custody of an endangered child, I
have no intention of obscuring absolute immunity’s shortcomings.
Indeed, as I have discussed at length, absolute immunity for social
workers, as articulated by the courts that have chosen it, is predicated on
a weak and unexamined analogy to prosecutors. The policy arguments in
its favor are premised on sixty years of unsubstantiated judicial and
scholarly intuition about what motivates and inhibits public officials in
the discharge of their duties. These intuitions may or may not reflect the
truth about prosecutors in the first place and, whether true or untrue
with regards to prosecutors, may be entirely different for child welfare
workers. What we do know is that prosecutorial immunity has been more
difficult to adjudicate and administer than it initially promised to be. And
although qualified immunity presents nearly insurmountable hurdles for
most parents seeking constitutional damages against social workers,
there will be some cases in which the difference between qualified and
281
absolute immunity will be outcome-determinative. For these plaintiffs,
absolute immunity eliminates not only damages relief, but also an
opportunity to be heard about the constitutional violations they suffered.
My argument is simply that we should prefer these defects to a
system that gives social workers reason to view intervention as a riskier
282
endeavor than standing by and doing nothing. To make peace with a
system in which social workers can be held liable for removing a child
from a potentially dangerous home but not for leaving him there, one
would have to be willing to assert that social workers are completely
impervious to the differential incentives created by such a lopsided
liability scheme. I am willing to acknowledge this possibility. But in the
absence of empirical evidence to support it, it is a bold and dangerous
proposition. The cost of it being wrong—even for just one abused child
whose overworked, underpaid caseworker is unreasonably afraid of
being sued—is very high. In contrast, conferring absolute immunity on
social workers in the limited way that I have proposed fits comfortably
within current immunity jurisprudence and eliminates recovery for only
that very narrow group of plaintiffs who would be able to surmount both
the hurdle of qualified immunity and DeShaney’s substantive limitations.

280. See supra Part IV.B.
281. See supra Part IV.C.
282. See supra Part I.
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The essential point is this: Until we have reliable empirical data that
tells us whether social worker decisionmaking is influenced by a fear of
liability, we have to assume either that it is or that it is not. In my view,
the vulnerability of the children who depend on this system makes the
latter assumption unacceptable. We should strive to equalize the
incentives on either side of a removal decision unless and until we know
that such parity is unnecessary. Absolute immunity, for all its flaws, can
restore that equipoise.
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